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1.?Introduction
I am publishing in this Journal, a series of papers on Japan?s experiences as a borrower from the 
World Bank (WB) between 1951 and 1966, by reviewing reports published by the WB and the docu-
ments available at the WB Archives. The purpose of the study is to record Japan?s experiences as a bor-
rower from the WB, and to qualitatively evaluate the relationship between Japan and the WB.
The entire series is periodically organized in the following order:
a. Overview
b. 1951?1953, From Applying for Membership and Joining the WB to Receiving the First Loan
c. 1954?1957, Receiving Small Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange Expenditures
d. 1958?1961, Receiving Loans for Financing Foreign Exchange and Local Cost Expenditures and 
Becoming Ineligible for Borrowing from the WB
e. 1963?1966, Restarting Borrowing from the WB and Graduating from Borrowing
f. Concluding Remarks
The first paper was published in October 2011 in this Journal.1 It addressed the initial two themes, 
items a. and b.: an overview of Japan?s borrowing from the WB and Japan?s initial association with the 
† Former Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University from 1997 to 2010; and, current Emeritus as 
well as University Professor, Waseda University. Also former World Bank Staff from 1967 to 1996. Holds a Ph.D. in economics 
from Cornell University.  
Author?s note: all the papers are being written on the basis of the review of published information, including ones of the Ar-
chives of the IMF and the World Bank.
1 Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 17, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, October 31, 2011, pp. 217?244: 
http://dspace.wul.waseda.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2065/35041/1/AjiaTaiheiyoTokyu_17_Abe.pdf
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WB between 1951 and 1953. The second paper was published in August 2013 also in this Journal.2 The 
paper addressed the item c., analyzing how Japan received small loans only for financing foreign ex-
change expenditures during the period 1954?1957 and how the WB dramatically announced the 
change of its lending policy to Japan in mid-1957 to finance not only the foreign exchange expendi-
tures, but also local cost expenditures. The current paper deals with the fourth theme, item d, in ana-
lyzing the way the WB expanded its lending operations to Japan and assisted Japan in getting into the 
New York financial market. The WB eventually stopped lending to Japan in 1961, though temporarily 
at first, after observing that Japan had achieved a high level of economic development and had essen-
tially graduated from being a WB?s borrower.
This paper consists of three parts: (1) the WB?s view on the Japanese economy that continued its high 
GDP growth rates between 1957 to 1961; (2) Japan?s borrowing from the WB during 1958?1961; and, (3) 
the cessation of WB?s lending to Japan by end of 1961. Annex 1 lists all the loans provided during the peri-
od and Annex 2 provides a summary description of the all the WB loans during the period under consid-
eration and gives information specific enough to highlight sector, project and the terms of each loan issue.
2.?The WB?s View on the Japanese Economy
The WB continued to review Japan?s development efforts through periodically visiting Japan and dis-
cussing economic issues with the government officials and prominent business leaders. The purpose of 
the review was to assess the country?s economic and financial policy, and the amount of external debt 
the country could afford. The WB?s views on the Japanese economy was an important factor in justify-
ing the bank?s lending strategy on the amount of lending and priority sectors for lending operations.
The first table below shows the rate at which the economy was expanding and adjusting year by year 
since 1957 and the second table presents the balance-of-payments. Japan experienced spectacular cy-
clical waves of contraction and expansion during the period, 1957?1961. Included was a full business 
cycle with the second period in 1957 as a peak, the second period in 1958 as a trough and the fourth 
period in 1961 as a peak.3 This was the third cyclical experience in the post-war economy. Table 1 indi-
cates rapid economic growth from 1959 onwards with a higher than 13? annual increase in real GNP 
and an annual increase in industrial production exceeding 20?. The annual price indices were rather 
stable in the case of wholesale prices but relatively higher increases were seen in consumer prices in 
1960 and 1961. Table 2 on the balance-of payments indicates large deficits in merchandise balance in 
1957 and 1961 and quite comfortable surplus for 1958?60 due to: (1) a sharp decline in imports in 
1958; (2) considerable increases in exports in 1959 and 1960; (3) increasing trend of deficits in ?Other 
Services?, including shipping costs; and, (4) continued large incomes through the ?US Military Expen-
ditures? offsetting part of deficit in ?Other Services?.
 2 Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 21, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, August 31, 2013, pp. 213?257: 
http://dspace.wul.waseda.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2065/39814/3/AjiaTaiheiyoTokyu_21_Abe.pdf
 3 Annual Report on National Income Statistics, Economic Planning Agency, Japan, 1967. 
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Between 1958 and 1961, the WB published four economic reports in January and December 1958, 
October 1959 and April 1961.4 All reports can be found in the external site of the World Bank?s Home 
Page. Each report served varying purposes in directing WB?s lending policy. The first two reports in 
1958 supported WB?s expanded lending operations in Japan and the 1959 report was the watershed 
publication that clearly highlighted Japan?s economic development experiences more positively than 
before. The last report of 1961 reconfirmed the strength of Japan?s economy supporting WB?s chang-
ing stance and leading to the termination of lending to Japan.5, 6
 4 They are: ?Memorandum on Recent Economic and Financial Developments in Japan? dated January 15, 1958; ?Japan?s Eco-
nomic Situation and Prospects,? dated December 22, 1958; ?The Economic Position and Prospects of Japan,? dated October 
14, 1959: and, ?The Recent Economic Situation in Japan,? dated April 13, 1961.
 5 All economic reports are posted on the external home page of the WB. In the Archives, there is no document concerning discus-
sions on the terms of reference of each economic mission, the basis for selecting particular economists for economic mission as-
signments, the process of finalizing the draft of each report within WB and the records of discussions between Japan and WB. 
Thus it is impossible to judge the degree of usefulness of the economic analysis done by the WB for policy makers in Japan. 
 6 At IMF external home page, available are ?Background Material for Consultations with Japan from 1957 to 1961? prepared by 
the Asian Department and the Exchange Restriction Department, IMF. The background material, annually prepared, contains 
detail information and analysis on the Japanese economy and economic policies. 
Table 1.?Economic Indicators for Japan 1957?1961
Percentage Changes over Preceding Year
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
GNP (real terms) 7.9 3.2 17.9 13.2 14.0
Industrial Production 18.1 0.1 20.0 24.5 19.3
Gross Domestic Capital Formation 23.3 ?21.4 61.8 26.9 36.6
Personal Consumption Expenditure 5.4 5.7 7.1 9.0 8.6
Merchandise Balance of the Balance of
?Payments (Millions of US$) ?402.0 370.0 361.0 268.0 ?559.0
Wholesale Prices 3.0 ?5.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Consumer Prices 3.0 ?0.4 1.0 3.5 5.3
Net Bank Credit 23.2 5.8 5.1 9.0 11.1
Money Supply 4.1 12.8 16.5 19.1 19.0
Source: Various Economic Reports of the World Bank.
Table 2.?Summary of International Transactions, 1957?1961 (in millions of US dollars)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Goods and services 
Exports f.o.b. 2,840 2,869 3,408 3,978 4,149
Imports f.o.b. 3,242 2,500 3,047 3,711 4,707
Merchandise Balance ?402 370 361 268 ?559
Other Services ?667 ?510 ?381 ?538 ?813
US Military Expenditures 449 404 381 413 389
Total Goods and Services  
?(including transfer payments) ?620 264 361 143 ?983
Capital Transactions ?619 301 418 176 ?964
Errors and Omissions 1 37 57 33 19
Change in foreign reserves ?417 337 461 502 ?338
Source: International Balance of Payments, pp. 281?282, Economic Statistics of Japan, 1963, The 
Bank of Japan 1964.
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The main purpose of the January 1958 report was to check how the Government was coping with 
the balance of payments crisis in 1957 and its effectiveness of economic policies to restrain the heated 
economy. The characteristics of the external balance problem in 1957 were: (1) a less than expected in-
crease in exports as well imports, and a lower rate of increase in exports that could be attributed to 
lower growth rate of world trade; (2) the increase in stocks was quite rapid; and, (3) the loss of foreign 
exchange reserves was sudden and quite considerable.
The implementation of monetary restraint measures was swift, with the basic discount rate succes-
sively raised in March, May and June 1957. While the Bank of Japan gave incentive measures for ex-
port financing, selective and direct measures were taken against imports. For example, deposit re-
quirements for imports were raised, and the foreign exchange allocation for imports was significantly 
reduced. On the fiscal front, there was a sizable budget deficit in spite of the Government?s efforts to 
postpone certain expenditures and a large increase in tax revenue from a rapidly growing economy. 
The government, in addition to these measures, withdrew US$125 million from IMF in 1957. With the 
WB closely monitoring these events, its view on Japanese economy became very positive during 
1956/1957. The WB?s assessment was that with the stronger manufacturing capacity compared to ear-
lier, Japan could continue to increase its national income at 4?5? a year over the next five years, with-
out major balance-of-payments problems and that Japan could prudently contract a sizable volume of 
additional foreign debt.
On the short term prospects, the WB was skeptical about Government projections that tight fiscal 
and monetary policies should make it possible to produce a balance of payments surplus of US$200 
million in the fiscal year 1958 (April 1958?March 1959), a major shift from a deficit of about US$400 
million in the fiscal year 1957. The Government assumed an increase in exports by US$300 million 
and a reduction in imports by a similar amount. The WB considered the estimated increase in exports 
and decrease in imports too optimistic. The report stated that the loss of foreign exchange had been 
halted and that inflationary pressures had subsided. But it also point out that the level at which inter-
national payments and receipts were balanced would not be high enough to assure a level of imports 
sufficient to support the continued expansion of the economy.
On long-term prospects and credit worthiness, the report concluded that adjusted annual growth 
rates of 5.8? was still too high, but was considered acceptable on the assumption that exports and im-
ports would also grow at that rate. Further, the report evaluated that there was no significant change in 
Japan?s external long-term indebtedness, and that it could prudently receive a sizable new debt. This 
debt could be further used on additional investment required in basic facilities and industries, which 
would relieve the strain imposed on Japan?s resources over the next few years. (Ibid, p. 10)
The December 1958 Report, published 11 months after the issuance of the last report, was still 
cautious on the prospects of the Japanese economy. After losing more than US$200 million of reserves 
again in the second quarter of 1957, the economy began to show the effects of the policy measures. In-
dustrial production declined by 1? in the third quarter of 1957 and through the second quarter of 
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1958 and the rate of increase in stocks declined sharply. While exports continued to be at the peak lev-
els in value terms during 1957 and 1958, imports declined sharply. Consequently, reserves began to 
rise again. Monetary relaxation started in May 1958 and the gradual decrease in the basic discount rate 
was carried out in a phased manner. The WB observed the developments on how the economy was 
gaining momentum and stated that:
?It may be that these developments have marked the end of the post-war period of very rapid 
expansion in the Japanese economy and that rates of economic growth more nearly in line 
with those of other industrial countries as can be expected in the future. Such a development 
can hardly be one for concern, however, especially in view of the remarkable recovery and ex-
pansion of the Japanese economy since the war? (Ibid., p. 1).
By analyzing the changing structure of the export-driven industries favoring manufacturing indus-
trial sectors and the reduced role of the textile industry (Ibid., pp. 10?12), the report considered aver-
age annual growth rates of 5 or 6? of exports feasible and adequate to keep the economy growing at 
4?5? per year. The report also explained the justification on Japan?s efforts to expand the national 
economy substantially in order to provide employment opportunities for the rapidly growing labor 
force. This was in consideration of the rapid increase in the working age group, as the children born in 
the early postwar period were to reach working age. Furthermore supporting the WB?s lending to steel, 
power and transportation sectors, the report stated that:
? [?] In order to facilitate the growth in national product, it is of first importance that some of 
the basic facilities of the economy be improved and expanded. Transportation and power are 
the fields where the needs appear most urgent. Some further modernization and expansion of 
steel making facilities is also necessary. After the mid 1960?s the pressure for rapid expansion 
should begin to diminish. In these circumstances it appears reasonable for Japan to supple-
ment its own resources by external borrowing in the years immediately ahead to assist in 
achieving the highest rate of economic growth consistent with financial stability. ? (Ibid., p. 14)
The October 1959 Report was published after Japan had regained momentum of its economic ex-
pansion once again. Monetary relaxation started in May 1958, and a gradual decrease in the basic dis-
count rate was made step by step until February 1959. The economic mission saw inventory investment 
and private capital formation increase significantly and also large increase in exports. On imports, its 
significant decline was the major cause of restoration of trade accounts balance in 1958 and this pattern 
was different from the last cyclical experience in 1954/5 where the exports increased significantly and 
the imports had an increase, but only marginally. The report analyzed that for the first time Japan?s low 
import dependency was lower than other trading countries?. The report stated that:
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?[?] The decline in Japan?s import dependence has been opposite to the general world trend, 
for with a few exceptions, such as Belgium, France and the United States, the import depen-
dence of the major trading nations of the free world has increased in comparison with pre-
war. Moreover, in those few cases where the dependence has declined, the declines have been 
considerably smaller than in the case of Japan. [?] The decline in Japan?s import dependence 
has been made possible mainly by the change in the industrial structure and by more inten-
sive exploitation of domestic resources. [?].? (Ibid., p. 4)
The report evaluated basic parameters provided by the Economic Planning Agency for economic 
growth until the end of 1962, which would become the basis for an Income Doubling Plan to be for-
malized as a Government official policy in December 1960 (Ibid., pp. 17?23). For a change, the WB 
also did not quarrel much regarding the annual growth rates of GNP at 6.5?, exports at 10?, and im-
ports at 7?. With exports, the report discussed the potential problems and inherent limitations to 
penetrate further into the US and European markets. This was attributed to the changing industrial 
structure in Japan, export commodity adaptability to changing export demand, and the rate of growth 
of exports at 10? was considered possible, though the growth rate was considerably higher than that 
of total world trade. On imports, taking into account of all non-trade factors as well, such as the proba-
ble decline in special procurements of the US forces, obligations to the US for post war aid and to oth-
er countries for outstanding war damage claims, the rate of growth of imports was estimated at 7?. 
The report however questioned the assumed relationship between growth rates in imports (7?) and 
industrial production (8?). The WB considered that an 8? growth rate for industry would be too 
high for keeping the 7? growth rate for imports consistent with the equilibrium in the bal-
ance-of-payments position. Even with the assumed decline in the import dependency rate, the WB 
clearly expected lower growth rates for GNP/industry than the Government projections.
On resources reallocation, the report highlighted a growing problem of lagging investment in public 
economic services. The most neglected sector was the transport sector, and the main bottleneck was 
explained by the lack of paved roads against increased vehicles, buses and trucks and rail capacity 
nearing saturation point. Port facilities and coastal shipping capacity were also in need of expansion, 
and the straights between islands would have to be deepened. All in all, major diversion of domestic 
savings to the public sector was needed and borrowing investment capital from overseas was consid-
ered necessary. (Ibid., pp. 24?26)
The WB?s April 1961 Report was prepared, without visiting Japan, to review rapid developments 
of the economy in the years 1959 and 1960. Special attention was given to the factors which facilitated 
the rapid growth without monetary or balance of payments difficulties, and Japan?s longer run eco-
nomic prospects was also covered. Its ?Summary and Conclusion? section started with a sentence, ?In 
the past two years the economy of Japan has expanded on a scale which was surprisingly large even by 
Japanese standards.?
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The report pointed out that the most basic factor for rapid economic growth was the skill, vigor and 
drive of the Japanese people and their ingenuity and flexibility in finding and capitalizing on foreign 
and domestic economic opportunities. It also explained the high savings ratio and investment rates 
and smooth transfer of labor from less productive sectors to more productive sectors while creating no 
major labor bottlenecks. The report further mentioned that the trend of real wage increase lagging be-
hind labor productivity, which facilitated the realization of high profit incentives for further invest-
ment and expansion. In the process of investment and expansion: (1) industrial technologies were 
modernized; (2) the industrial structure shifted from less capital intensive textile and light manufac-
turing industries to heavy, electrical and chemical industries; and, (3) there was a rapid expansion in 
the automobile, appliances and other consumer durables industries and in the more expensive synthet-
ic textiles. These industries were essentially expanding to satisfy the increasing consumers? demand 
that was attributed to rising incomes and consequent changes in the patterns of expenditures. As for 
the financing of public expenditures, because of strong increase in tax revenues, it became easier than 
before to raise the level of expenditures directly undertaken by the government and even to increase 
the transfer of funds from the public sector to the private sector.
In terms of the balance of capital accounts, the inflow of long-term capital was nearly balanced by 
outflows in payment on debt and in foreign credits and investments. But there was a large inflow of 
short-term capital, which reached US$400 million in 1960. Much of this increase was due to a series of 
policy actions taken to liberalize foreign exchange transactions, such as the establishment of non-resi-
dent convertibility and of transferable yen accounts in mid-1960. The main category of the capital in-
flow was due mainly to the increase in commercial import credits. Regulations governing such credits 
were progressively eased since early 1959 by expanding the list of eligible import items and by length-
ening the permissible credit periods.
On the longer-term prospects, the report uses ?the Income Doubling Plan in Ten Years? for its analy-
sis. The Plan?s central objective was double national income in real terms in the 10-year period by 
achieving an annual growth of 7.2?. This would mean per capita income of $579 at 1956?58 prices by 
1970. The Plan was based on the assumption that the factors, which produced the economic growth, 
which Japan enjoyed during the 10 years preceding 1960/61, would continue during the decade for the 
1960s. The reports stated that:
?[?]. The targets are indeed ambitious. They do not, however, aim at higher rates of expan-
sion than were achieved in the last decade, and one hesitates to inject a skeptical view, consid-
ering the past performance of the Japanese economy and the frequency of past errors of un-
derestimation in assessing Japan?s capacity for economic expansion?
As the text in the report suggested the WB had its reservations on the continuous high savings rates, 
and on an export growth rate of about 10? per year to finance imports. Regarding the savings rates, 
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the report stated that high rates could only be maintained when there was a relative shift in private in-
come distribution towards corporate profits at the expense of individual incomes. On the contrary, the 
shift was actually towards individual incomes. In terms of export increases, the report went on to men-
tion that even if Japan was successful in achieving high rate of export growth as in the past, the relative 
rate of technological development would be slower in the 1960s than it was in the 1950s, and there was 
also the uncertainty in world trade as a whole. After saying that such development would in time bring 
Japan?s growth rates more into line with those of other industrial countries, it went on to state that it 
was probably safe to assume that all relevant variables were relatively high on average. On credit wor-
thiness, service on the external debt would be easily manageable even with adverse balance of pay-
ments swings, given the strong position of Japan?s exchange reserves.
The principal conclusions of all the reports were that:
(1) Rapid growth of the economy, though slower than the past, was expected to continue for 
some time but the balance-of-payments problems would continue to create cyclical pattern of 
the economy every now and then;
(2) Monetary policy was the chief reliable policy instrument to cope with the balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties caused by increased imports. The policy mechanism was to change dis-
count rates of the Bank of Japan to control the amount of commercial banks? lending influ-
encing the amount of investment by the private sector;
(3) Extra investment in the public sector would be needed to strengthen transport, and com-
munications operations in order to facilitate smooth economic growth and this could be fa-
cilitated by foreign borrowing for public investment; and,
(4) Japan would be amply creditworthy for additional foreign borrowing.
The WB saw quick progress in investing in modernization of industrial production and in the shift 
towards the more capital-intensive industries, i.e. heavy, electrical and chemical industries, and away 
from the less capital intensive industries, i.e. textile and light manufacturing industries. While they ac-
cepted higher (lower) rate of increase in GNP and exports (imports) than those of Western countries?, 
their thinking on the future prospects was an eventual conversion of those high rates of Japan to lower 
ones of other industrial countries. On cyclical patterns of Japanese economy, they analyzed the rela-
tionships between very high rate of economic growth and maintenance of balance of payments equi-
librium, and the implementation of economic policies to slow down the speed of economic growth 
when the payments deficit increased and to stimulate the economy when the balance of payments 
equilibrium was attained. The WB reaffirmed Japan?s capability to manage the implementation of poli-
cies for economic growth and to control periodic overheated demand associated with deterioration of 
the balance of payments position. It is interesting to note that there was no full review of Japan?s de-
gree of accessibility, in comparison with other comparable European countries? situation, to interna-
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tional capital markets for financing investment needs, although her good accessibility was WB?s main 
criteria to stop lending to Japan in 1961. Nor was there a comparative analysis of the level of economic 
development of Japan with ones of other countries, which were also receiving WB?s loans at that time.
3.?The World Bank?s Expanded Lending to Japan
3.1?Overview
The WB shifted its lending policy to Japan in 1957 to provide loans, as part of project financing it 
could not only be used for foreign exchange, but also for local expenditures. This shift implied WB?s 
support for Japan?s economic development initiatives, even more than before. The Japanese govern-
ment and potential borrowers/beneficiaries welcomed the shift, as borrowing foreign exchange for lo-
cal expenditures of projects meant that Japanese private sector beneficiaries could get extra additional 
Yen funding for the implementation of their investment programs. Winning of the procurement con-
tracts by the Japanese contractors meant extra business for the contractors as well. The extra foreign 
exchange receipts for the Japanese government were to be used on imports and also contributed to ex-
tra foreign exchange reserves and additional budgetary resources for its public investment. This was a 
much preferred borrowing form for Japan, which needed as much as possible, both foreign exchange 
as well as local currency resources.
The new lending policy delivered larger amounts of lending to Japan more efficiently than before. 
The total lending (in terms of commitment) to Japan amounted to $403 million equivalent during the 
period from January 1958 and end December 1961 or about $100 million per annum during the four-
year period. As Table 3 shows, the total number of loans dramatically increased to 16, consisting of 
eight to the steel, five to the power and three to the transport sectors and the total commitments to 
these respective sectors amounted to $130 million, $113 million, and $160 million. Estimated dis-
bursements increased from $4 million in end Fiscal Year (FY) 1954 and reached a plateau of $105 mil-
lion in end FY1959 and stayed more than $60 million per year upto 1961.
Table 3.?Loans to Japan during 1958?1961 (Calendar Year)
Calendar  
Year




















1958 4* 73 3* 91 7 164
1959 2** 44 1*^ 10 3 54
1960 2^ 13 1* 40 3 53
1961 1** 12 2^ 120 3 132
Total 8 130 5 113 3 160 16 403
* denote projects/loans included in the original lending program;
** projects/loans added soon after the original lending program had been agreed; and,
^ loans co-financing or in association with funds raised in the private capital market in one form or another.
Sources: WB?s Annual Reports, 1957?58?1961?62 and symbols by the author.
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The increased commitment to Japan meant that its position went up in the list of the dozen largest 
borrowers from the WB, to number 2 in the list for FY 1962 as Table 4 shows (from being the last in 
the list for FY 1957). It is interesting to note that in end FY 1962 the list still included France, Austra-
lia, Italy, United Kingdom, and Belgium. This indicates the significance of the key role the WB played 
in the reconstruction efforts of these war-damaged countries, rather than provide economic assistance 
for the developing countries.
This expanded lending was only possible because of improved dialogue between the Japanese gov-
ernment officials and the WB?s. The initial efforts made by the two sides in 1957 and early 1958 were 
impressive in achieving improved dialogue and implementing the lending program. As Japan?s eco-
nomic growth continued, the WB took a flexible approach to adding new projects/loans on the top of 
the originally agreed lending program, and only limiting lending to the three sectors, i.e. steel, power 
and transport. It also gave advice to the government on how to get access to New York capital markets 
and vigorously tried to introduce Japan to the system of international procurements, by especially us-
ing the opportunity while implementing transport sector projects in the public sector.
Once the WB reaffirmed Japan?s capability to manage the implementation of economic growth poli-
cies, control periodic overheated demand associated with deterioration of the balance of payments po-
sition and have access to international capital markets, the WB decided in 1961 to stop lending to Ja-
pan. The WB?s position was that Japan?s economic development had now reached such high levels that 
she should not be seeking WB financing except for small-scale, joint operations so as to allow the pri-
vate sector companies to raise necessary funds in the private capital market.
To explain how the expanded WB?s lending operations were implemented, described in the follow-
ing sections are the details of the actual lending by sector, the evolution of lending procedures and pro-
grams, and noteworthy interactions between the WB and Japan in the implementation of its lending 
program. Annex 1 lists all the WB loans, while Annex 2 provides a summary of the all these loans pro-
Table 4.?Changes in Major Borrowers of the World Bank
Country Loan Amount Country Loan Amount
FY1957 (US$ million) FY1962 (US$ million)
1 Australia 318 India 846
2 France 268 Japan 488
3 India 240 France 419
4 Netherland 221 Australia 418
5 Brazil 169 Mexico 406
6 Italy 165 Italy 300
7 Mexico 151 Brazil 292
8 United Kingdom 146 Colombia 270
9 South Africa 135 Pakistan 256
10 Belgium 111 United Kingdom 246
11 Colombia 106 South Africa 222
12 Japan  78 Belgium 201
Sources: World Bank?s Annual Reports, 1956?57 and 1961?1962.
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vided during the period under consideration. The summary details information, specific enough to 
highlight sector, project and loan issues associated with each loan.
3.2?Lending by Sector
3.2.1?Lending to the Steel Sector
Of the total 16 loans, eight, as shown in Table 3 above and Table 5 below, were for the steel sector. 
The initial lending program set in 1957 after the annual meeting included the first four projects and 
the first one, the Kawasaki II project, was prepared without any field visits to Japan. It was clear by 
then that the WB was comfortable with completing the appraisal work based on information provided 
by Kawasaki. The remaining three projects were appraised together in February/March 1958. Later 
Fuji and Yawata II were added in the lending program by the end of 1957. Following these two, were 
the last two for the sector, Kawasaki III and Sumitomo II were added in October 1959. These last two 
loans were small amounts, US$ 6 and 7 million respectively, as they were part of a joint financing with 
the funds obtained in the capital market.
The total amount of loans to the steel sector was $130 million, accounting for 16? of the total proj-
ect amount. All loans were made to the Japan Development Bank (JDB) as the borrower and the pro-
ceeds were re-lent to each steel company. All had 15 years terms, and these were shorter than the loans 
provided to the power and transport sectors, which were for 20?25 years, in effect also reflecting the 
lives of financed plants and equipment. Except for the two loans, Nihon Kokan II and Kawasaki III, 
that financed all imports equipment, all other loans financed mainly local cost expenditures. As can be 
seen, the WB financed investment programs of all major steel companies in Japan. Kawasaki steel re-
Table 5.?Loans to the Steel Sector
Date of  
Agreement
Beneficiary  
of Loan Project Contents
Loan Amount  
(US$ million)
Total Project Cost  
(US$ million)
01/29/1958 Kawasaki Steel II Construction of a new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Chiba plant 
8 20
07/11/1958 Sumitomo Metal Installation of a new blast furnace and blooming 
mill at Wakayama plant
33 83
08/18/1958 Kobe Steel Installation of a new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Nadahama plant
10 36
09/10/1958 Japan Steel Tube II Construction of a strip mill and expansion of 
seamless tube mill near Tokyo
22 67
11/12/1959 Fuji Steel Construction of a new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Hirohata plant
24 203
11/12/1959 Yawata Steel II Construction of two blast furnaces and related 
facilities at Tobata plant
20 244
12/20/1960 Kawasaki Steel III Installation of a plate mill and related facilities at 
Chiba plant
6 20
12/20/1960 Sumitomo Metal II Construction of a hot strip and plate mill related 
facilities at Wakayama plant
7 47
Total 130 820
Sources: Respective Annual and Appraisal Reports prepared by the World Bank.
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ceived three loans, Yawata, Sumitomo and Nihon Kokan received two while Kobe received one.
In view of the heavy commitments made to the steel industry within a short span of time, the WB 
felt the need of an analysis on the validity of five-year expansion programs for the whole steel industry. 
This was formally called as the Second Modernization Program for 1957?1962 of Japan and the WB 
reviewed a study of market prospects for the industry prepared by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI).7 The modernization program envisaged substantial increases in capacity to all 
segments of the industry and significant changes, both in the pattern of raw material consumption and 
in the composition of finished products.
The increase in capacity of crude steel production estimated by the WB (and by MITI) was 16 (20.2) 
million tons in 1962 from 11.7 million tons in 1956, with no increase in scrap imports. The increase in 
crude steel production was to be accompanied by major changes in the pattern of steel making by in-
creased production of blast furnace pig iron to 12 million tons from 6 million tons for the same time 
period, and by modernization of rolling mill facilities for the production of thin flat products. After 
comparing crude steel demand with a lower economic growth rate than MITI?s, the WB?s report con-
cluded that:
??there is no indication that if expansion of Japanese capacity for the production of crude steel 
and pig iron is limited to the projects now firmly planned, any serious problem of overcapacity 
is likely to arise, even if demand falls considerably short of MITI?s estimates.? (Ibid., p. 5)
On this basis of rather optimistic steel demand, the WB loans were provided to the Japanese steel in-
dustry. Though the WB underestimated the prospects of the steel production, the financial support of 
the WB to the second modernization program helped Japan greatly achieve in expanding the steel 
making capacity. In fact, the actual crude steel production increased to 27.3 million tons in 1962 from 
11.7 million tons in 1956.
3.2.2?Lending to the Power Sector
Out of the total 16 loans, five loans, as shown in Tables 3 above and 6 below, went to the power sec-
tor. The total amount of loans to the power sector was $113 million, accounting for 27.3? of the total 
project cost. Out of the total amount of loans, only $9.3 million was used for financing import items. 
The WB shift to finance local cost expenditures fitted well to finance large civil works, e.g. construc-
tion of hydroelectric dams. Observing successful installation of thermal power plants by three power 
companies, Kansai, Chubu and Kyushu that were financed by the first loan from the WB in 1953, the 
WB?s view on the electric sector in Japan became more positive than before. The WB considered the 
power sector as one of the key sectors in achieving economic development, and in terms of its man-
 7 Vide Japan: Sector Report-Japanese Steel Market Prospects, 1957, June 24, 1958, Report No. TO-178, the World Bank. 
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agement capability and engineering capacity the WB continued to support the power sector. All loans 
were associated only with the projects of companies supplying 60 Hz electricity.8
As in the case of the steel sector, all the four, originally agreed projects were appraised in November/
December 1957 and the JDB was the borrower and the loans went to the power companies, even to 
Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC), a public sector company. The EPDC project was fi-
nanced by a WB loan of $10 million and jointly financed by government bonds of $30 million, issued 
in the NY capital market.9 This government bond issuance was the first public fund raising operation 
after the WWII. An additional loan for Kyushu Power II was requested by Japan in late 1957. The loan 
for Kyushu II became the last one in the power sector during the period under study. The first four 
loans had 25 years terms while Kyushu Power II was only for 20 years, as the first four loans were asso-
ciated with hydroelectric dam and Kyushu Power II, with a thermal power plant having shorter life 
than the hydroelectric dam. Due to a long history of mishandling by the company on project prepara-
tion, and non-action taken by the Government on the electricity rates, the WB took a long time to 
agree to finance part of the expenditures associated with the construction of the first stage of 
Shinkokura thermal power plant in northern Kyushu.10 From 1956 to 1961, Japan?s electricity genera-
tion capacity increased to 26.0 million Kw (of which 12.7 million Kw was through hydropower) from 
13.5 million Kw (of which 9.6 million Kw was through hydro power). The total capacity increase asso-
ciated with the WB?s financing through the four projects amounted to about 1.1 million Kw.
 8 This implied no loan was given to Tokyo, Tohoku and Hokkaido Electricity Companies supplying 50 Hz electricity. They bor-
rowed foreign exchange funds from US Export?Import Bank. 
 9 Detailed account of the government bond issue is in p. 195?197 of this paper.
10 History of Kyushu project ending with the formulation of a thermal power project is well explained in Memorandum, N. K. 
Chakravarti to Mr. Martin M. Rosen, Japan-Kyushu Power Project II, June 9, 1960, Japan-Kyushu Power Project (02), Folder # 
1878813, WB Archives. 
Table 6.?Loans to the Power Sector
Date of  
Agreement
Beneficiary  
of Loan Project Contents
Loan Amount  
US$ million
Total Project Cost 
US$ million
06/13/1958 Kansai Electric Power II Construction of a 258 Mw hydroelectric Kurobe 
dam
37 118
06/27/1958 Hokuriku Electric Power Construction of a 261 Mw hydroelectric Arimine 
dam
25 92
09/10/1958 Chubu Electric Power II Construction of two Hatanagi dams, two 
hydroelectric power stations, each with 85,000 
Kw capacity
29 73
02/17/1959 Electric Power Development Installation of a Miboro reservoir-controlled 
hydroelectric dam with 215 Mw Capacity
10 103
03/16/1961 Kyushu Electric Power II Construction of the first stage of a steam power 
plant with a capacity of 156 Mw
12 28
Total 113 414
Sources: Respective Annual and Appraisal Reports prepared by the World Bank.
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3.2.3?Lending to the Transport Sector
Of the total 16 loans, three loans were for the transport sector, as shown in Table 3 above and Table 7 
below. The total amount of loans to the transport sector was $160 million, accounting for 18? of the 
total project cost. The last two projects were associated one way or another with Japan?s borrowing op-
erations in the capital market. Though the WB was well aware that the lack of transport capacity 
would affect Japan?s efforts to further achieve economic growth,11 it took some time for the WB to fo-
cus on the serious bottlenecks to be addressed and choosing the specific projects that could use WB 
lending. In the original lending program agreed in 1957, only one transport loan for a highway project 
(construction of an initial toll road between Kobe and Nagoya) was included in the list. But later, two 
loans, one for rail (in late 1960) and the second for an expressway (early 1961) were added in the WB?s 
lending program.
There was a clear shift in the WB?s financing pattern from lending to the private industries in steel 
and power, albeit being heavily regulated, to the public infrastructure sector. The start of lending to the 
road sector was also consistent with Japan?s shift in transport policy from more reliance on the railway 
sector under the control of the Ministry of Transport to road development under the Ministry of Con-
struction (MOC) in late 1950s. MOC carried out a series of studies on road development through col-
laboration with its own staff, US highway consultants and the Watkins Mission, which consisted of a 
large group of US experts in highway engineering, public finance, and transport economics.12 After the 
review of the Watkins? Report and several mission visits to Japan, the WB finally decided to consider 
the project as a serious candidate for WB?s financing.13 This project was to become the beginning of 
WB?s major financial as well as technical contribution to Japan?s development of the expressways be-
tween Kobe and Tokyo.
The WB reviewed in February 1958 the Japanese government?s proposed project to construct an ex-
11 Vide Economic Report, Development and Prospects of the Economy, July 25, 1957, pp. 14?15, the World Bank.
12 The Watkins? report was a thorough, detailed analysis by competent specialists (Vide Kobe?Nagoya Expressway Survey for the 
Ministry of Construction of August 8, 1956). Initial concerns of WB on the proposed Kobe?Nagoya expressway project were 
high cost construction program and its priority given over the improvement on the existing highway networks and their 
maintenance and lack of specific information on the design, location and cost estimates of the expressway. 
13 Vide Sector Report, the Proposed Expressway in Japan, April 25, 1958, the World Bank. 
Table 7.?Loans to the Transport Sector
Date of 
Agreement Implementing Agency Project Contents
Loan Amount 
US$ million
Total Project Cost 
US$ million
03/17/1960 Japan Highway Public 
Corp?rtn I
Expressway Construction: Ritto?Amagasaki 
Section, 71.5 km
40 131
05/02/1961 Japan National Railways The New Tokaido Railway Line 80 548
11/29/1961 Japan Highway Public 
Corp?rtn II
Expressway Construction: Ichinomiya?Ritto 
(104 km) & Amagasaki-Nishinomiya (7 km)
40 212
Total 160 891
Sources: Respective Annual and Appraisal Reports prepared by the World Bank.
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pressway between Kobe and Nagoya. Its review found the need to further improve the quality of proj-
ect preparatory work. The WB?s basic approach was to reduce the investment cost estimates and to im-
prove the expertise and the ability of the Japan Highway Public Corporation (Kodan), and to use this 
Kobe?Nagoya expressway as a trial project, a model case for future projects in the sector. Accordingly 
the WB asked the Government to hire foreign consultants to study alignment and design proposed by 
the Kodan and to consider stage construction by having two lanes, and additional two lanes to be add-
ed later on. The Kodan hired consultants to review earthmoving and construction methods for possi-
ble construction cost reduction and to give advice on soil engineering and the design of pavements 
and supervising earth and pavement works. The study also included checking the designs and plans of 
the project for the remaining sections of the whole expressway. Eventually, the basis for the project cost 
estimates did become consolidated and the first expressway project in Japan, Kodan I was built as the 
first toll expressway. Subsequently the remaining sections of the expressway extending all the way to 
Nagoya were constructed partly financed by Kodan II.
In the case of the New Tokaido Railway Line project (Shinkansen), the WB had initially three prob-
lems: (1) Japan National Railways (JNR) recorded very poor financial results with operating losses for 
the years, 1958?1959 and a rate of return of total assets of 1? and negative interest coverage; (2) The 
originally proposed 250 km/hour for passenger train operations looked as though it was an experi-
ment; and, (3) The proposed new-standard gauge tracks would not connect efficiently with the then 
existing narrow gauge railway system across the country. After many discussions with JNR engineers, 
the WB gradually came around to support the Shinkansen as worthy of support for WB financing. 
While the whole process of preparing the Kobe?Nagoya Expressway and New Tokaido Railway Line 
projects is an interesting subject by itself, each case has been further summarized in Annex 2.
3.3?Evolution of the Lending Program and Procedures
3.3.1?Initial Lending Program and Additions
During Mr. Black?s visit to Japan in May 1957, the WB requested the Japanese Government to pre-
pare a multi-year public investment program, and a borrowing program from the WB and other 
sources, including the US Export?Import Bank (USEIB) and the financial markets. By the time of the 
annual meeting in September 1957, Japan?s borrowing program became firmer and the role of the 
USEIB reduced. According to the submission of Japan?s request at the time of the annual meeting, pri-
ority was given to the power sector followed by the iron/steel sector and then the transport sector. 
With a proposal of borrowing $315 million (about 32.5? of the total project cost) over three to five 
years, financing was to be carried out through both foreign exchange and local cost expenditures with 
the total project cost of $970 million.
Specifically, the projects included construction of six large-scale dams (out of the total project cost 
amounting to $581 million, $166 million was proposed for WB lending, 28.6? of the total) by Electric 
Power Development, Chubu, Hokuriku, and Kansai Power companies. For the steel/iron sector there 
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was the construction of 4 steel plants (out of the total of $193 million, $71 million for WB lending, 
36.8? of the total) by Nippon Kokan, Kawasaki Steel, Sumitomo Metal and Kobe Steel Works. For the 
transport sector there was the construction of the Nagoya?Kobe Highway by Japan Highway Public 
Corporation (out of the total of $195 million, $78 million for WB lending, 40? of the total).14 The 
proposed projects for WB financing emphasizing power, steel and transportation sectors were consis-
tent with the WB?s judgment15 and the borrowing program from the USEIB was also within the 
amount specified by the WB.16
During the meeting, the WB indicated that the overall lending program as described above was ac-
ceptable. But as the requested lending program was substantially more than the case with any other 
country, the WB wanted to make it certain to Japan that it could not continue to borrow substantially 
for imports from sources other than the WB. This point was explained also from the point of view that 
the lending gear had shifted from not only financing the foreign exchange component to financing for-
eign exchange plus local cost expenditures. After the meeting, in October, the management reported to 
the WB?s Executive Directors the conclusion of the meeting with the Japanese delegation on the large 
lending program in the form of loans involving local currency financing. One Executive Director 
asked if Japan was going to borrow $300 million only from the WB and Mr. Black said ?yes? to be fol-
lowed by ?over the next three to four years? by his staff.17
While the large new multi-year lending program was getting settled in within the WB, the Japanese 
Government requested for an additional three projects for consideration for WB?s financing, on top of 
the already agreed list of the projects. The three newly proposed projects included one steel project 
each for Fuji and Yawata steel and one power project for Kyushu power.18 These projects were not in 
time to be included in the original list, within the Japanese screening system for the preparation of the 
formal list of projects for WB?s consideration. On the request for Kyushu power, the review of a ther-
mal power proposal was delayed due to constraints faced by the WB?s staff, and in the case of Yawata 
and Fuji, they misunderstood the intent of WB?s commitment on the local currency financing and the 
extent of the foreign exchange financing. As a result, some USEIB lending was involved in financing of 
14 Memorandum from R. F. Quandt to Files, Discussion with Mr. Ichimada, Finance Minister of Japan, on Future IBRD Opera-
tions in Japan, September 24, 1957, dated September 24, 1957, Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
15 According to the 1957 Economic Report, a typical statement was made: ?[?] Among the principle bottlenecks which have 
emerged are steel, power and transport. [?].? Economic Report?Japan, Development and Prospects of the Economy, July 31, 
1957, pp. 14?15. 
16 There were a couple of communications between WB and Japan on USEIB. Re: Letter, Mr. Naokado Nishihara, Financial 
Commissioner to Messrs. Martin M. Rosen and Richard F. Quandt, dated July 27, 1957; Memorandum, I. P. M. Cargill to 
Files, Japan?Discussion with Mr. Watanabe, August 2, 1957, August 5, 1957; and Letter, Martin M. Rosen to Mr. Nishihara, 
August 26, 1957, Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
17 Re: Transcript of Proceedings, ?Operational Report: Supplemental Report,? 292nd Regular Meeting of Executive Directors, 
October 17, 1957, pp. 25?27, WB Archives. 
18 Memorandum, R. F. Quandt to Members of Japanese Working Party, Japan: Additional Borrowing Proposals, November 13, 
1957, Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
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the steel projects. However, the steel projects were eventually added in the list.19
While the new lending program was being implemented, the Japanese Government continued to 
press for a further increase in the WB?s lending to Japan, after the new lending program was complet-
ed during the annual meeting in October 1958. Mr. Sato, Minister of Finance, mentioned three more 
projects suitable for WB lending: nuclear power, railways and land reclamation. On a possible nuclear 
power project, Mr. Black explained to the Minister that since the Japanese planned to use a British type 
of reactor, in view of WB?s requirement for international competitive bidding, the WB was not suited 
for financing the nuclear power project. But the WB would still consider looking into the railway proj-
ect in the future. Mr. Black felt it was too early to discuss additional loans when the existing lending 
program had reached only half way by then.20
3.3.2?Improved Lending Procedures
While the initial lending program was being determined, the WB staff assigned to the Japan21 opera-
tions worked on how to simplify procedures and to make processing speedier against the negative sen-
timents from many Japanese involved in borrowing from the WB. Key issues were:
(1) The negative pledge and pledging of general mortgage note in the Guarantee Agreements 
between the WB and Japan;
(2) Financial covenants such as debt/equity ratio, reevaluation of reserves, debt restrictions 
and power rates in the Project Agreements between the WB and the final beneficiary;
(3) Need for having international bidding for procurements, clearance on future major in-
vestments by the beneficiaries and Government?s commitment to financing projects imple-
mented by the beneficiaries; and,
(4) JDB?s role as a real substantive borrower and a possible agent for appraisal and supervi-
sion works.
The WB methodically worked on these in order to improve the procedures and processes. The most 
important change was related to the basic stand of the WB vis-à-vis Japan: the WB decided to accept 
the Japanese methods of financial transactions among Japanese parties even if the loan agreements be-
tween a final beneficiary and its various creditors looked inconsistent from the WB?s point of view. 
This meant that the WB was prepared to accept the loan agreements in the Japanese form if their 
terms were in order and contained no provisions inconsistent with Japanese standards. On the basis of 
19 Vide Memorandum, Martin M. Rosen to Mr. Davidson Sommers, Japan-Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel, January 22, 1958, 
Japan-General, Steel, Folder # 1857433, WB Archives.
20 Vide Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, Japan-Delegation meeting with Messrs. Black and Knapp, October 23, 1958, 
Japan-General, Folder # 1857457, WB Archives.
21 Included were the two staff who had written a memorandum in January 1956, in connection with negotiations with the loan 
to Yawata Steel suggesting WB?s need to acknowledge fundamental differences in the meanings of outlook, contractual rela-
tions and forms of expression, and conventional financial doctrines understood by the WB and Japan. Vide Japan and the 
World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (2), p. 231. 
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this new understanding, the WB decided to let the JDB become the real partner for financial transac-
tions. The final beneficiaries then accepted the JDB?s statement of the underlying final beneficiaries? 
long-term debt and factory estate and/or mortgage position and its assurance that the JDB itself was 
satisfied that the relative agreements and security instruments were secured. It meant that the JDB as-
sumed responsibility for the preparation of the subsidiary loan agreements with the final beneficiaries 
since these were agreements among Japanese parties in Japan under Japanese law. While this clearly in-
creased the role of the JDB, it should be noted that the WB did not amend its own role in making inde-
pendent technical, financial and legal appraisals for projects.
In addition, the WB decided to speed up project appraisals and loan negotiations through improved 
quality of information obtained from the final beneficiaries with the help of the JDB and to be more 
flexible than before on financial loan conditions, concerning the loans associated with power and steel 
companies. Other questions on the need of Government guarantees and on international competitive 
procurements for procuring goods to be financed from the loans were kept as items to be re-explained 
to the Japanese side as normal requirements of the WB lending operations.22 Available memoranda in-
dicate that an experienced project?s staff from the Industry Division visited Japan in July 1957 to ex-
plain the WB?s lending approach to the government agencies, the JDB and the assigned final beneficia-
ries in order to facilitate the implementation of the large lending program.23
Once the new lending procedure was established, the WB was eager to show to Japan a new WB. In 
the letter from the WB to the Japanese Ministry of Finance after the annual meeting in 1957,24 the WB 
indicated its willingness to start work immediately on projects familiar to the WB, especially with the 
case of the steel sector. The WB considered the Kawasaki Steel project as a good candidate project 
ready for negotiations, even without sending an appraisal mission to Japan, assuming Kawasaki could 
send the required information on time. On power projects, the WB indicated in the same letter that a 
specialist team was to visit Japan to review one of Kansai, two of Chubu, three of EPDC, and six of 
Hokuriku power projects. Simultaneous appraisals for many projects at the same time were unusual 
for the WB as one or two project appraisals at a time was the general practice.
The Kawasaki Steel negotiations executed under the new style were completed on January 1958 and the 
loan was presented to the Board of Executive Directors? meeting in the same month. The new lending re-
gime worked well and the whole process took much shorter than ones under the old regime. Since this 
project was the first one under the new regime, the President Report had a full explanation of the new 
22 Among many memoranda on improved procedures, principal ones are: Memoranda, N. R. Chakavarti to Files dated June 19, 
1957 entitled ?Working Party Meeting held at 11 am on June 10, 1957 on Japan-Simplification of Loan Operation procedure? 
and also dated July 9, 1957 on the same subject. These meetings were attended by staff of Technical Operations Department 
dealing with power and steel projects, lawyers and country desk officers. On the role of JDB, Vide Staff Loan Committee 
Memorandum SLC/O/922 from Department of Operations East Asia, Japan?The Pattern of the Bank?s Lending for Private 
Enterprises in Japan, dated December 26, 1957. All can be found in Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
23 Letters, H. B. Ripman (from Japan) to L. M. Svovoda, dated July 4, July 5, and July 9, 1957; and Letters, H. B. Ripman to B. 
Chadenet dated July 24 and July 26, 1957, Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
24 Letter, Rosen to Nishihara, October 25, 1957, Japan-General-Steel, Folder # 1857433, WB Archives.
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lending approach to Japan.25 The Report explained that Japan planned to borrow about $300 million over 
the next three years from the WB, and a great part of this borrowing would be for expenditures in Japan. 
Apart from that it mentioned that the external borrowing of foreign exchange from sources other than 
the WB would be limited. Reflecting the increased role of the JDB, this loan was the first one without a 
Project Agreement between Kawasaki Steel and the WB and it was replaced with a Subsidiary Agreement 
between the JDB and Kawasaki Steel. This practice became the standard one for all future loans to final 
beneficiaries including the electric power companies, essentially through the JDB as the primary borrow-
er. The final beneficiaries, e.g. Kawasaki and Yawata steel and Kansai and Chubu power, that received 
loans from the WB did see the drastic change and this time and they were pleased to deal with a new WB.
3.3.3?Japan?s Access to the Capital Market
The WB?s basic strategy in 1957 was to finance Japan?s development in a broader scale and to help 
Japan re-enter into the international capital markets. This basic strategy did go pretty well. The initial 
lending program was being implemented almost as planned and her economy continued to grow even 
better than the WB?s expectation. Japan?s access to international capital markets was then the pressing 
issue, as she needed a large sum of foreign exchange to finance investment programs in both public 
and private sectors. Since domestic savings were already very high, there was no choice but to go for 
foreign borrowing. One of the sources of foreign exchange was to have access to the capital markets of 
the world. After the World War II, Japan did not have a chance to try and reenter into global capital 
markets. The WB literally played a crucial role of being Japan?s advisor starting from 1957 to early 
1959 when Japan had a successful issue of public bonds in the New York market.
The WB had an instrument since 1954 to support member governments who could directly borrow 
from the private investors. This was for the WB to participate in joint financing of projects with the 
private investment bankers on behalf of a borrower. The first application of this instrument was in De-
cember 1954 for Belgium with the purpose of improving its internal waterways and the Port of Ant-
werp.26 The total borrowing for the project was $50 million with private investors? share being $30 mil-
lion and WB, a fifteen-year loan of $20 million. The intention of the WB?s instrument was not only to 
provide funds, but also to enhance the attractiveness of the market offering, by certifying both the 
credit worthiness of Belgium and the soundness of the proposed project. The WB thought that this in-
strument was suitable in the case of Japan as well.
With the urging of the WB, the Japanese government in 1957 considered the Kobe?Nagoya express-
way project as a potentially good vehicle to reenter into the NY capital market, for a possible bond is-
sue. The government tried various ways to find suitable investment bankers to manage the financial 
operations, and it finally ended up with two, First Boston and Morgan Stanley. While the WB agreed 
25 Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a proposed loan to the Japan Development Bank 
for the Kawasaki Steel Corporation Second Blast Furnace Project, January 20, 1958. 
26 Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Belgium, 
December 1, 1954.
?     ?
Yoshiaki Abe
196
with the government?s approach on its selection, the WB asked if it was in Japan?s interest to have the 
first public offering of a bond issue being a highway revenue bond. Coupled with the fact that further 
project preparation would take some more time, the WB thought that a direct government issue rather 
than the highway revenue bond might be received better in the market. Consequently, the expressway 
project was dropped from spearheading overseas Japanese bond issue and eventually financed only by 
the WB.27
The Government decided in early 1958 to plan a bond issue in the NY market with First Boston as 
its banker, sometime in the fall. The Japanese Government wished to do this jointly with a WB loan for 
EPDC?s Miboro hydroelectric power project following the 1954 Belgian case. The Government, WB 
and First Boston discussed frequently on how to proceed with the possible bond issuance.28 The main 
issues needing coordination were: (1) determining the issuer of the bonds, whether it would be the 
government, the JDB or EPDC and the size of the offering; (2) the preparation of the legal documents 
for the government, WB and First Boston; and, (3) the synchronization of the timing of the whole op-
erations among the three organizations. By mid August 1958, a basic structure of the joint operations 
emerged with the amount being $30 million, consisting of $15 million in 3, 4 and 5-year bonds and 
$15 million in 15-year bonds. The issuer was to be the Government of Japan and the Government was 
to offer simultaneously with a WB loan of $10 million associated with EPD?s Miboro power project.
Eventually, the legislation was sent to the Diet on December 20, 1958 to allow the Government to 
borrow funds in the NY market. First Boston filed a registration statement on December 29, 1958 and 
WB?s Board gave the preliminary approval for the proposed loan at a meeting on the same date. On 
February 18, 1959, the WB approved a $10 million loan and Japan made a public offering of $30 mil-
lion of bonds on the New York market. The first Japanese offering was well received in the market. In a 
letter to Mr. Sato, the Minister of Finance, Mr. Black stated that ?[?] In reporting to the Executive Di-
rectors of the WB this morning I advised them that this bond issue was one of the most successful re-
27 Additionally speaking, Morgan Stanley refused to share the job with First Boston and declined invitation. Mr. Black advise the 
Japanese that Morgan Stanley did not want the job as they do not want to share management of the syndicate on a rotating ba-
sis with another house. Their willingness to do so in the case of the WB was an exception and they did not want to do the 
same thing with in any other case. Vide Memorandum, Martin K. Rosen, Files, Japan-Relations with investment bankers, No-
vember 27, 1957, Japan-General, Folder # 1857456, WB Archives.
28 There are many memoranda and reports concerning the first public offering of Japanese government?s bond available in the 
WB archives. Listed chronologically are some of important items: Memorandum, I. P. N. Cargill to Files, Japan?Bond Issue, 
March 5, 1958; Japan-General, Folder # 1857457, WB Archives; Letter, Naokado Nishihara to Martin M. Rosen, May 14, 1958, 
Japan-General, Folder # 1857457, WB Archives; Letter, Martin M. Rosen to Mr. Nishihara, May 29, 1958, Japan-General, 
Folder # 1857457, WB Archives; Memorandum, M. M. Rosen to Files, JAPAN?Public Bond Issue, August 11, 1958, Ja-
pan-Miboro Project, Folder # 1857789, WB Archives; Memorandum, R. F. Quandt to Files, Japan?Discussions with First 
Boston Corporation on the Coordination of their proposed Public issue of Japanese Government Bonds and the Bank?s Pro-
posed Loan for the Miboro Project of the Electric Power Development Corporation, November 3, 1958, Japan-Miboro Project, 
Folder # 1857789, WB Archives; and, Memorandum, J. B. Knapp to Files, JAPAN?telephone conversation with Mr. George 
Woods of the First Boston Corporation, New York, January 14, 1959, Japan-Miboro Project, Folder # 1857789, WB Archives.
 Preliminary Report of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Japan Development Bank for the 
Miboro Hydroelectric Power Project of the Electric Power Development Company, December 22, 1958; and, Supplemental 
Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Japan Development 
Bank for the Miboro hydroelectric Power Project of the Electric Power Development Company, February 9, 1959.
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cently offered in the NY market in that a amount of the sales went to the American investors who had 
not previously purchased foreign dollar bond issues. [?]?.29
3.4?The WB Stops Lending to Japan
The WB planned carefully for Japan?s graduation from being its borrower?but in the end, it was 
only temporary. Graduation here refers to the WB?s formal decision that a country has attained a cer-
tain level of development that renders it ineligible for additional WB borrowing. It reflects the achieve-
ments of a country in reaching a certain level of development, capacity to manage the national econo-
my effectively and have access to capital markets.30 Since Japan?s record of economic development and 
her ability to manage its economy was ascertained, the only remaining element needing certification 
for her graduation was of Japan?s accessibility to capital markets. The WB?s strategy in 1959 was that 
while WB would continue to lend for two more years, but this lending would be in the form of com-
bined operations with the funds raised in capital markets. These points were explained to the Govern-
ment during the annual meetings in 1959 and 1960. At the annual meeting in 1959, Mr. Black formally 
mentioned for the first time that the Japanese economy reached such a level that it was inappropriate 
for WB to continue lending to Japan.
Actual lending in 1960 and 1961 for Kawasaki Steel III, Sumitomo II, New Tokaido railway line and 
Kodan II, indicate that all loans were associated with joint financing in one form or another. One ex-
ception was a loan to Kyushu Power, which was one of the remaining loans included in the initial lend-
ing program. The Kyushu project had a series of problems during its formulation as mentioned in p. 
189 of this paper, and the WB utilized the occasion of its Board presentation on March 15, 1961 to ex-
plain WB?s intention on the imminent graduation of Japan. On that day Mr. Rosen, the Director of 
Operations for Far East sent a telex to Mr. Knapp, the Vice President of the WB who was in the Philip-
pines and on his way to Tokyo, on the whole issue of how to end the lending to Japan. This was com-
municated to the Board as well and they agreed that the next Kodan loan (the second one) would be a 
combined lending with a market offering, and then that would be the last loan to mark the end of 
WB?s lending activities in Japan. Though not detailed in the telex, there were also critical discussions 
at the Board meeting on the lack of competitive bidding for the Kyushu project. Arriving in Tokyo, Mr. 
Knapp had a meeting with the MOF and he delivered these messages.31
29 Letter, Eugine R. Black to Honorable Eisaku Sato, Minister of Finance, February 19, 1959, Japan-General, Folder # 1857457, 
WB Archives.
30 The legal cornerstone for graduation is Article III, Section 4 (ii) of the WB Articles of Agreement. It sates that the WB may 
guarantee or make loans if it is satisfied that, in the prevailing market conditions, a borrower would be otherwise unable to 
obtain the loan under reasonable conditions. The other provision relevant to graduation is Article 1 (ii), which states that WB 
financing supplements private investment when private investment is not available on reasonable terms. 
31 Vide Telexes, Rosen to Knapp in Manila Philippines, March 3, 1961 and Rosen to Knapp in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1961, Ja-
pan-General Folder # 18557458, WB Archives. The sentiment of the Board was clearly manifested in these telexes and Board 
members? questions on Japan?s graduation and the lack of competitive bidding. It is unfortunate that ?Transcript of Proceed-
ings? (formal record of discussions of the Board meetings) has not been declassified after the proceedings on August 8, 1957, 
declassified on the Aichi Irrigation Project. 
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The first experience of Japan in issuing a public bond after the World War II was successful in Feb-
ruary 1959. Though Japan was able to raise US$30 million in the New York market jointly with a WB 
loan, it was also obvious that Japan needed more time to establish herself well in the capital markets to 
be able to issue bonds regularly for significant amounts. The WB therefore thought that it still had an 
important role to play as a major source of foreign exchange for the next two to three years until Japan 
would establish herself well in the market. Before the annual meeting in September 1959, the WB care-
fully orchestrated a possible strategy for getting out of lending operations in Japan, after observing 
successful revitalization of the macro economic situation in 1958 as well as first 6 months in 1959. The 
strategy established was to continue lending US$100 million per year for two more years, to ensure the 
total lending reached the committed total amount of $500 million. This lending was to be implement-
ed in the form of combined lending operations with funds available in the capital markets. Part of the 
WB?s strategy was also to exert pressure the Japanese government to make every effort to raise foreign 
exchange resources from the capital market and to get foreign private entrepreneurs to invest in Ja-
pan.32
During the annual meeting in September 1959,33 while the Minister of Finance requested the WB to 
continue its lending, the WB?s President clearly indicated to the Japanese delegation that:
?[?]. When I visited Japan in 1957, WB felt a bigger program of lending should be arranged 
which now has been largely carried out. Recently the Japanese economy had made great 
strides and the question was whether it would be appropriate for WB to continue lending in 
Japan. Some people expressed the opinion that Japan was not doing what it could do to at-
tract private investment capital to Japan and it would be difficult to propose to the Board at 
this time a substantial program for lending over a number of years. At the same time, provid-
ed that Japan did all it could to raise the capital needed in the private markets in Europe and 
US, WB felt it should continue its very good relationship with Japan and continue lending for 
suitable projects. [?].?
After the annual meeting, the WB reviewed the Japanese request for further lending and concluded 
not to finance steel projects beyond the second steel expansion program. The WB decided to go ahead 
with the preparation of Kawasaki III and Sumitomo II projects only if they could form a suitable pro-
posal for joint operations with the private market and to consider possible projects in the transport 
32 Memorandum, SLC/O/1022, Staff Loan Committee, Department of Operations Far East, ?Prospective Lending to Japan,? Sep-
tember 8, 1959, and Memorandum, SLC/M/764, Staff Loan Committee, Minutes of Staff Loan Committee Meeting held on 
Friday, September 11, 1959 (on ?Prospective Lending to Japan?), October 6, 1959, Japan-General Folder # 1857458, WB Ar-
chives.
33 Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, Japan??Delegation meeting with Mr. Rosen on Saturday, September 26,? September 
28, 1959; Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, Japan??Delegation meeting with Mr. Black, September 29, 1959, Ja-
pan-General Folder # 1857458, WB Archives. 
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followed by power sector.34 The strategy as above was followed, almost literally in the execution of the 
lending program, though Japanese Government continued to request more loans to highways, electric 
power and iron and steel projects for 1961.35 In response to the government?s further request, Mr. Ros-
en, Director of Operations, Far East told Mr. Mizuta, Minister of MOF, his personal views, during their 
meeting in Tokyo in March 1961 that the loan for New Tokaido railway project should have been the 
last one and that it would not justify WB lending to Japan after it reached such a high level of econom-
ic development.36 The WB made the two loans to two steel companies (Kawasaki III and Sumitomo 
Metal II) in December 1960 jointly financing the projects with New York financiers.37 It made a loan of 
US$80 million to the Japanese National Railways (JNR) in May 1961 for the New Tokaido railway 
project synchronized with a US$ 20 million bond issue in the New York market by the Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Corporation (NTT).38 Later, the WB in November 1961 made a second loan of 
$40 million, to Doro Kodan only after the JDB had successfully completed a US$20 million issue.39
The WB lending to Japan jointly with funds raised in the capital market did not go smoothly. In the 
case of the two loans to the steel companies, both Kawasaki and Sumitomo had found raising funds in 
the New York market almost impossible. They opted instead to arrange for moderate sized loans on a 
medium-term basis, from American commercial banks. The WB considered these unacceptable, as 
these were not one of typical joint market operations for tapping long-term investment funds.40 After 
solving other problems such as including some items in the projects going beyond the scope of the sec-
ond expansion program, they formally applied to the WB for a loan with possible joint operations with 
the private market.41 Kawasaki appointed First Boston as their bankers in early 1960 for the private 
placement of their notes for an amount of $4 million in the NY market. The notes were for a term of 
ten years, bearing interest at 7.5? annually and unsecured obligations of Kawasaki.
But because of political developments and uncertainties surrounding Japan?s ratification of the US?
Japan Security Treaty, Kawasaki faced difficulty in obtaining firm commitment from investors. In or-
der to encourage the investors to stay in, the WB shifted its firm position on the matching fund princi-
ple to an increase in its lending amount to US$6 million. The WB loan was for a term of 15 years 
34 Memorandum, SLC/O/1028, Staff Loan Committee, Department of Operations Far East, ?Japan-Selection of Projects,? Octo-
ber 7, 1959 and SLC/M/765, Staff Loan Committee, Minutes of Staff Loan Committee Meeting held on Friday, October 9, 
1959 (on ?the selection of projects?), October 14, 1959, Japan-General Folder # 1857458, WB Archives.
35 Vide Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, Japan-Meeting with the Delegation, October 3, 1960, Japan-General Folder # 
1857458, WB Archives.
36 Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, ?Japan?Mr. Rosen?s meeting with Mr. Mizuta, Minister of Finance,? March 4, 1961, 
Japan-General Folder # 18557458, WB Archives.
37 For details on the loans and financing structure, see Yoshiaki Abe (2011). 
38 NTT?s US$20 million bonds consisted of 15 million 15-year bonds and 1.6 million three-year, 1.7 million four-year, and 1.7 
million, five-year bonds. 
39 JDB?s US$20 million bonds consisted of 15 million 15-year bonds and 5 million three-, four- and five-year bonds.
40 Vide Letters, Martin M. Rosen, Director, Department of Operations?Far East, the World Bank to Shosoku Omori, Chairman, 
Kawasaki Steel Corporation, January 5, 1960, Japan-Kawasaki(03) Folder # 1878772, and Martin M. Rosen, Director, Depart-
ment of Operations?Far East, the World Bank to Hosai Hyuga, Chief Managing Director, Sumitomo Metal Industries Steel, 
January 5, 1960, Japan-Sumitomo (02), Folder # 1878795, WB Archives.
41 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/60-29, Staff Loan Committee, ?Kawasaki?s Loan Application,? July 8, 1960.
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bearing and interest of 5?3/4? annually and guaranteed by the Government of Japan. On Sumitomo 
notes, Kidder, Peabody & Company acting as bankers for the Sumitomo Metal, placed with institu-
tional investors US$5.8 million of Sumitomo notes. The notes were for a term of 14 years bearing an 
interest at 7.5? annually and guaranteed by the Sumitomo Bank. The WB loan of US$7 million had 
the same terms as the loan to Kawasaki as above. These transactions were made in December 1960. It 
took a long time to get rather small investment funds for the total size of investments for Kawasaki and 
Sumitomo Metal, because of the involvement of the WB?s lending.
In the case of a loan to the Japan National Railroad (JNR), the WB originally thought that this loan 
was a good candidate for another joint financing operation. In spite of the WB?s insistence in going for a 
joint financing operation, the Government did not want to use the railway loan to raise additional funds 
in the capital market.42 It was planning to make a sale of $20 million bonds with the guarantee of the gov-
ernment through Dillon, Read & Co., First Boston, Barnet & Co. for the Nippon Telephone & Telegram 
Public Corporation (NTT) in the NY market. During the annual meeting in September 1960, the WB 
proposed that the signing of the railway loan could be arranged at about the same time as the bonds were 
marketed.43 Japan continued its request to receive the railway loan independent from joint financing op-
erations. However the bonds offering did not get a good response from the market and the WB eventual-
ly decided to prepare a $80 million loan for the railway and timed it at its Board presentation.44
There were two President Reports on this loan: the first was dated March 23, 1961 entitled Preliminary 
Report and the second, Supplemental Report dated April 24, 1961. In the first, the report explained: ?WB 
has been considering a loan to JNR to be made at about the time NTT made a public issue of bonds in 
the NY market. Discussions among the Government, NTT and the NY underwriters had now pro-
gressed to the point at which the underwriters desire to file registration statement with SEC for a public 
offering of US$15?20 million to be made in the second half of April 1961?. In the second report more de-
tails were provided on NTT?s offering of $15 million consisting of 3, 4 and 5-year bonds amounting to $5 
million and 15-year bonds amounting to $10 million.45 It was indeed not a joint financing operation, but 
the timing of WB?s loan approval was synchronized with the sale of the NTT bonds. This synchroniza-
tion with the simultaneous WB operations was considered helpful in marketing the bonds.
In the case of the loan to Doro Kodan, the WB made a Board presentation thereof in November 
1961, only after the JDB successfully sold $20 million ($5 million 3, 4 and 5-year 5?5.25? and $15 
million 15-year 6?) bonds in the New York Market in early October 1961. The offering was made 
without the WB?s assistance as in the case of NTT?s bonds. This transaction turned out to be the last 
42 Vide Memorandum, A. G. Kheradjou to Files, ?Japan-Meeting with the Delegation,? October 3, 1960, Japan-General Folder # 
1857458, WB Archives.
43 ibid., as in the footnote 13 above.
44 Memorandum, SLC/O/61-2, Department of Operations Far East, Staff Loan Committee, Japan?Loan Application for New 
Tokaido Line Railway Project, January 3, 1961, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project,Folder # 1878831, WB Archives.
45 It is interesting to find Letter, W. R. Hill, Jr., Vice President of Dillon, Read & Co. Inc. to the WB, ?Nippon Telegraph & Tele-
phone Public Corporation 6? Guaranteed Telegraph & Telephone Dollar Bonds due 1976,? May 2, 1961 stated that the 
amount of the long term bonds was in fact $15 million. Japan-New Tokaido Line Project, Folder # 1878832, WB Archives.
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World Bank loan to Japan during this period. In the President Report on the second expressway proj-
ect, Mr. Black made a formal statement:
?Early this year, the Japanese Government requested the Bank to consider making a second 
loan of $40 million to the Kodan to help finance the completion of the Kobe?Nagoya express-
way. Taking into account the efforts being made by the Government to tap the resources of 
the private market (the latest example is the $20 million placed by the JDB in the New York 
market in October 1961), I agreed to consider the proposed loan to the Kodan. I informed 
the Executive Directors of this on March 15, 1961, and at that time I mentioned that his 
would probably be the last loan to Japan except small loans for joint operations which would 
facilitate access of private companies to the market.?46
As such, though the door was not completely shut, but it was pretty clear that the WB was not willing 
to provide loans any longer to Japan, as a major financier. It is not clear whether these issuances of bonds 
and notes were indicative of Japanese ability, be it the government, the public sector or the private sector, 
in having sufficient accessibility to the capital markets. After all, these experiences were only associated 
with the notes and bonds issued only in the market in New York. Japan was not yet popular in any other 
market. It must be recognized the fact that the government and the public as well as private sector corpo-
rations learned at least how to get into the New York market to tap into long-term resources.
3.5?Noteworthy Interactions between the WB and Japan
Typical professional dialogues between the WB and Japan occurred at the time of project preparation 
as well as during appraisals, loan negotiations and project implementation. Mentioned herein are the dia-
logues between the two on issues having sector wide implications. Specific interactions within the proj-
ects are incorporated in Annex 2 showing the summary of description of each loan extended by WB 
during the period under consideration. A typical example of interactions within project refers to the WB?s 
technical support in the construction of a thin arch dam for the Kurobe power project for Kansai Power.
3.5.1?Overinvestment in the Steel Industry
From the start of the steel project preparation, the WB recognized the steel industry?s tendency for 
overinvestment on the basis of optimistic demand projections. After completing initial lending to four 
steel companies and while preparing for lending to Yawata and Fuji in 1959, the WB learned that the 
steel companies were continuing to increase investment for further expansion of the steel making ca-
pacity. Though there were boom conditions for the steel industry at that time, the staff working in the 
Japanese steel projects suggested to senior management of the WB to draw Japanese authorities? atten-
tion to the real demand for steel. This was to be done at the WB annual meeting in September 1959, to 
46 Vide Report and Recommendations of the President to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Loan to Nihon Doro Kodan 
(Japan Highway Public Corporation) for the Kobe?Nagoya Expressway Second Project, November 21, 1961.
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highlight the importance of careful evaluation of the potential demand for Japanese steel and the un-
derlying importance of evaluating the financial condition of the steel companies.47 The WB chose not 
to warn the Japanese delegation of the issue of possible overinvestment in the steel industry during the 
annual meeting,48 but continued to be concerned over the financial health of each company.
The supervision report of the WB, in March/April of 1964,49 explained what the six steel companies 
were doing about the extended target debt/equity ratio as agreed back in early 1963 after the recession 
in 1962.50 While most of the companies limited their capital expenditures and increased their capital 
by share issues in order to reach 50 : 50 by 1964, none of the Ministry of Finance, security houses and 
banks considered a 50 : 50 ratio a necessary condition for the steel companies? financial health. They 
even stated to the visiting WB mission that the 50 : 50 ratio was ensured only because the ratio was an 
international obligation for getting WB loans in the future and for Japan?s international financial repu-
tation. The same report indicated the serious problem the steel industry had faced of excess capacity 
for the first time during the recession in 1962, and the industry began to realize in the recovery period 
in 1963 the excess capacity and its negative effects on steel prices being a continuous problem. The re-
port concluded by saying that:
?Measures for the improvement of the earning power would be a slowdown in expansion, cost 
reduction and better steel prices. The Japanese attitude to consider a company?s share in the 
market, the yardstick of success and the minor role played by return on investment in the steel 
manufacturer?s thinking, represent the major obstacles for an improvement of earning power.?
In 1967, the WB?s technical specialists on steel reviewed the six companies? expansion program and 
their financing plan to conclude that the debt equity ratio would not be kept as agreed and the finan-
cial outlook for the companies was very dubious. It was clear that the proposed expansion plans of the 
six steel companies financed by only 29.5? from net internal cash generated would adversely affect 
the security of the WB loans. It is interesting to note that the JDB wrote a letter to the WB informing 
that a plan was disclosed on April 17, 1968 of a merger of Yawata and Fuji with a view to acting effec-
tively to deal with the excessive competition in the steel industry.51
47 Memorandum, Siem Aldewereld to Messrs. Knapp and Rosen, Japanese Steel Industry?Expansion Plans, September 24, 1959, 
Japan-General Steel Folder #1857433, WB Archives. 
48 Vida Memorandum, Martin M. Rosen to Mr. J. Burke Knapp, Japanese Steel Industry, September 24, 1959, Japan-General 
Steel Folder # 1857433, WB Archives.
49 Memorandum, Gunther Mehlem to W. J. Armstrong, Back-to-Office Report End-Use, Loans to Six Japanese Steel Companies, 
April 6, 1964, Japan-Nippon Steel Project Folder # 1857749, WB Archives. 
50 Under the Agreements signed in Washington in March and April 1963, Sumitomo. Kawasaki and Kobe were obliged to make 
share issues by March 31, 1965 to attain the target debt/equity ratio of 50 : 50 (55 : 45 in case of Sumitomo). Yawata, Fuji and 
Nippon Kokan were to make share issues before March 31, 1965 in order to improve their ratio, a second share issue before 
March 31, 1967 should enable these companies to reach the target of 50 : 50 by that date. (Ibid., p. 2).
51 Vide Letter, Seiyu Soejima, Manager, Foreign Department, JDB to I.P.M. Cargill, Director, Asia Department, the World Bank, 
May 2, 1968, Japan-Nippon Steel Project-Tobata, Foleder # 1878740, WB Archives. 
?     ?203
Japan and the World Bank, 1951?1966: Japan as a Borrower (3)
3.5.2?Economic Analysis of Hydroelectric Project and Electricity Rates
After ascertaining financial management capability of the three power companies and recognizing 
the fact that WB financed project would be a small part of the total development programs of the com-
panies, the WB softened financial conditions compared with ones under the first lending operations in 
1953 to Kansai, Chubu and Kyushu power companies. The WB took a broader view on the Govern-
ment policy on the development of the power sector and its basic interests were in: (1) the Govern-
ment?s proper analysis of the economic merits of hydro electric dam development in comparison with 
alternative power sources because of only few remaining sites for hydroelectric power development 
with high construction costs and needing a proper sense of priority; and, (2) the improved system of 
the electricity rates determined by the Government in consistency with sound financial management 
of power companies.
On the justification for hydroelectric power projects, the issues were discussed during Kansai loan 
negotiations and WB drew attention to the policy of the government on the need for a more strict ap-
praisal of the economic merits of each case on the basis of firm design and cost estimates and careful 
consideration given to the cost of thermal power alternatives.52 While the WB did not push this princi-
ple by including it as a lending condition, each appraisal report for Kansai, Hokuriku, Chubu and EPD 
projects had sections as well as annexes on economic justification of hydroelectric power investments. 
This was done in comparison with other alternative thermal power projects and with the basic as-
sumptions on investments in thermal plant and transmission, thermal efficiency of alternative base 
load plants and price of fuel paid by each power company.53 These simple presentations were useful for 
public discussion on the merit of proposal for consideration of a hydroelectric power project. A ques-
tion could be asked if the government applied this principle in the process of hydroelectric power de-
velopment. Take the case of a proposed hydroelectric power project for Kyushu Power originally pro-
posed for WB financing. The WB found the proposal unacceptable as the rate of return on additional 
investment was too low to justify the WB?s financing. As a result, instead of a hydroelectric project, an 
alternative project, a thermal power project was financed as described in the above p. 189.
The only specific covenant applied in the power loans was the debt/equity ratio of 2 : 1 (e.g. the con-
solidated indebtedness of Kansai may not exceed twice its consolidated capital and surplus). At the 
time of project preparation, financial projections indicated that the financial position of not only Kan-
sai?s but also the others would deteriorate substantially within a few years unless they were allowed to 
charge adequate rates. During negotiations of the Kansai loan in April 1958, the WB insisted that the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) should improve the electricity rate determining 
52 See Memoranda, N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan?Kansai Power Project?Second Loan Negotiation, April 16 and 24, 1958, 
Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857745, WB Archives.
53 Appraisal of Kansai Hydroelectric Project, April 11, 1958, pp. 9?10 and Annex 11 Basis for the Calculation of Thermal Alter-
native; Appraisal of Hokuriku Hydroelectric Project, June 9, 1958, pp. 9?10, and Annex 9 ditto; Appraisal of the Hatanagi Hy-
droelectric Project, Chubu Eletric Power Company, August 22, 1958, pp. 6?7, Annex 8; and, Appraisal of Miboro Hydroelec-
tric Project of the Electric Power Development Company, LTD, December 22, 1958, pp. 7 and Annex 6 ditto.
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system, so that the power companies would be able to increase the rates consistent with sound finan-
cial management of power companies. The WB eventually obtained assurance from the Minister of 
MITI on undertaking a thorough study establishing a new basis for calculating power rates.54 During 
the project discussion on Hokuriku and Chubu, the same subject was discussed in 1958.55 After many 
discussions between the WB and the government, the government finally decided on the new regula-
tions to permit power companies to finance their expansion programs on a sounder basis, in the end 
of February 1960. With the rate increase for Kyushu by 10.5? on March 7, 1961, the WB Board finally 
approved Kyushu II on March 15, 1961. The rate increase actions were taken step by step to apply to 
other power companies as well. Though it took a long time, the efforts of the WB to improve the fi-
nancial position of the power companies through rate increases saw some results.
3.5.3? Procurement: International Competitive Bidding (ICB) in Expressway Construction 
and New Tokaido Railway Project
The subject concerns how the WB?s procurement policies56 applied to the three transport loans for 
the First and Second Expressway and the New Tokaido Line Projects. The WB did not insist on interna-
tional competitive bidding (ICB)57 on the power projects in the procurement of goods and services fi-
nanced by WB, even though large civil works were involved. This was especially the case for the remote 
location of dam construction works, which was not suited for foreign constructors to participate in ICB.
During the preparation of the First Expressway project, the WB wanted to make it certain that even 
if Japanese construction industry had sufficient capability to construct the expressway efficiently, the 
Japanese system of bidding for construction contracts should be open for real competition among bid-
ders in order to reduce the construction cost. The WB learned that Japanese contractors were compe-
tent but they lacked experience in modern expressway construction, particularly in large-scale earth-
moving and asphalt paving works and that they were proficient and well equipped for construction 
large bridges, viaducts and tunnels.
Recognizing the fact that there was no legal exclusion of foreign firms, but in practice they were not 
invited to bid, the WB concluded that foreign contractors with experience in expressway construction 
should also be invited to bid for the earthmoving and pavement contracts on the same terms as Japa-
nese firms. The final agreement with the Kodan on ICB included several prequalified foreign contrac-
54 Vide Appraisal Report on the Kansai Hydroelectric Project, April 11, 1958, para. 55 and Letter, Minister of International Trade 
and Indusry Shigesaburo Maeo to President Eugene R. Black, the World Bank, ?Power Rate Investigation Council,? May 27, 
1958, Japan-Kansai Power Project (2), Folder # 1857745, WB Archives.
55 Vide Appraisal Report on the Hokuriku Hydro electric Project, June 9, 1958, Paragraph 91 and Appsaisal Report on the Ha-
tanagi Hydroelectric project, Chubu Electric Power Company, August 22, 1958, Paragraphs 43 and 44. 
56 The WB?s procurement policies are guided by four main principles: the need for economy and efficiency, the interest in ensur-
ing that eligible bidders have equal opportunity to compete, the desire to encourage development of domestic industries, and 
the importance of having a transparent procurement process.
57 In financing arrangements involving WB, a bidding process is required by the borrower to procure resources funded by its 
loan according to a number of specified conditions. ICB requires WB borrowers to internationally advertise the required 
goods or services funded by their loans, issue bids for advertisement in an acceptable international language and award con-
tracts to the lowest acceptable bids, subject to certain considerations for qualitative judgment. Starting in 1951, ICB was grad-
ually introduced as the normal procedure in the lending operations.
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tors to be invited to bid on two major construction contracts involving large earthmoving and major 
bridge construction works. International competitive biddings were used for the first time in the histo-
ry of highway construction in Japan. The Government was also willing to authorize foreign contrac-
tors, if they win, to transfer reasonable amounts of foreign exchange for profit and overhead, deprecia-
tion of equipment and foreign personnel.58
The results of the first international competitive bidding on contracts for the Nagaoka?Kuga and 
Seta?Ritto sections, worth about US$ 5 million each, was that there were 29 Japanese contractors sub-
mitting prequalification forms and four international contactors submitting prequalification forms 
though 25 international contractors (all US companies) had requested prequalification forms. The WB 
was disappointed as only few companies were interested in getting the requalification forms but still 
felt ICB served a useful purpose in introducing a greater sense of competition among Japanese con-
tractors.59 Kodan invited 10 Japanese and three foreign contractors to bid only to find none of the for-
eign contractors participating in the bidding. The reason for one company was the unavailability of 
large size equipment to carry out works while the other two were too busy in other works.
On the basis of this experience, Kodan asked the WB to limit it to only domestic competitive bid-
ding even for major works. The WB insisted in retaining ICB, as the bidding results of the two sections 
resulted in having wider bid range, and the lowest initial bid had a bid price substantially lower than 
the estimated cost. By introducing simpler documentation for ICB than before in order to save Ko-
dan?s time to prepare English documents for the use by international contractors, Kodan continued to 
apply ICB for major works. This pattern continued in the second expressway project but no foreign 
contractor participated in bidding of Kodan?s subsequent works in the second project.
Similarly the WB asked the JNR to adopt ICB for civil works and rolling stock procurement in the 
implementation of New Tokaido Railway Line project, though ICB was not practiced to invite tenders 
from non-Japanese contractors or suppliers.60 The JNR invited on July 18, 1961 applications for con-
tracting construction works by public notice. Eight contractors from US, Canada, South Africa, Ger-
many and France asked for information but only three submitted applications. Two contractors were 
qualified, one from Canada for general construction work and one from France for steel bridge con-
struction. However the one from Canada for general construction work decided not to participate and 
the one French firm participated in bidding for bridge construction work (truss type, weighing about 
3,500 tons) with a price of Yen 81.8 million, but the winning bid by a Japanese contractor had a price 
of Yen 52.2 million. With this large bid price difference, the WB decided at the request of JNR to dis-
58 Vide Appraisal of the Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project, Japan, March 7, 1960, the World Bank, paras. 53?60, pp. 11?12.
59 Vide Memorandum, S. C. Hardy to Working Party, Japan-Loan 248-JA, Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway, International Competi-
tive Bidding, July 7, 1960; Letter, Michizo Kishi, President of Nihon Doro Kodan to Mr. H. J. van Helden, Department of 
Technical Operations, the World Bank, July 9, 1960; and, Memorandum, N. Chakravarti to Files, Japan-Highway Loan No. 
248-JA (Nihon Doro Kodan), July 11, 1960, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project, Folder # 1878756, WB Archives.
60 Vide Appraisal Report on New Tokaido Railway Line dated March 24, 1961, pp. 14?15, the World Bank. 
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continue international bidding for steel bridges.61
On the rolling stock, specifically for electric passenger rail cars, amounting to about US$ 30?40 million, 
sufficient for the initial operations on the new line, the JNR invited tenders for 180 railcars on July 8, 1962. 
The closing date for bidding was December 12, 1962. The submission of bidders? financial and technical 
prequalification information was September 1962. Upon the review of the specification of railcars, instruc-
tions to bidders and qualifications required of applicants, the WB suggested the JNR to change the instruc-
tions to suit to international bidding.62 Following the WB?s suggestions, the JNR responded by issuing addi-
tional information for the simplification of required bid documents to be prepared by the suppliers.63
Internal documents indicated that there were no objection to the railcar specifications, but there 
were serious handicaps for foreign manufacturers, e.g. the foreign bidders without experiences, which 
Japanese manufacturers could gain from the manufacturing of prototype rail cars, and too short deliv-
ery periods of railcar for foreign bidders to supply on time. Foreign bidder were naturally disadvan-
taged in terms of meeting the short delivery times, as it was necessary for the JNR to procure the first 
group of rail cars in order to avoid any delay in beginning operations. There were complaints against 
the way JNR presided ICB on the procurement of rail cars by European manufacturers and the WB?s 
Executive Director on behalf of European manufacturers.64 The WB?s reaction to this complaint was 
that everything possible was done by the WB to ensure that foreign firms were given equal opportuni-
ty to compete with Japanese firms on the terms of bidding, but it was not possible to remove the ad-
vantages that naturally existed for local firms from their physical presence in the country of the project 
and from their being much more familiar with the special technical aspects of the high speed trains.65 
In the end, European manufacturers did not participate in the bidding. Available documents in the Ar-
chives do not have any comments made by JNR on the requirement of the WB for the procurement of 
goods and services through ICB. It is therefore unknown if JNR felt useful to have tried ICB at all.
4.?Concluding Remarks
Japan welcomed the WB?s increased lending from 1958, by shifting the lending pattern from financ-
ing only foreign exchange to substantial local cost financing. Lending of about US$100 million a year 
61 There are many exchanges of cables and letters on ICB. A typical letter from JNR to WB on ICB reporting concretely steps 
taken by JNR on ICB is Letter, M. Kanematsu, Managing Director, Japanese National Railway to Mr. I. P. M. Cargill, Director, 
Operations Far East, International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, Progress and Outcome of International Bid-
ding, November 2, 1961, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project, Folder # 1878832, WB Archives.
62 Vide Letter, H.J. van Helden, Chief, Transportation Division, Department of Technical Operations, the World Bank to Mr. A. 
Yamada, Managing Director, Japan National Railways, August 22, 1962, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project, Folder # 1878832, 
WB Archives.
63 Vide Letter from Akiyoshi Yamada, managing Director, JNR, Mr. H. J. van Helden, Chief, Transportation Division, Depart-
ment of Technical Operations, the World Bank, September 13, 1962, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project, Folder # 1878833, WB 
Archives.
64 Vide Memorandum, Rene Larre to Burke Knapp, International Bidding in Japan, November 30, 1962, Japan-New Tokaido 
Line Project, Folder # 1878833, WB Archives.
65 Vide Memorandum from H.J. van Helden to Mr. S. Aldewereld, International Bidding for Japanese Railcars, December 13, 
1962, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project, Folder # 1878833, WB Archives.
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for the four-year period, 1958?1961 in the form of specific project financing was a big help to Japan?s 
efforts for speedy economic reconstruction and development. The execution of this magnitude of 
lending program was only possible because of the WB?s flexible adoption of new lending procedures, 
including the use of the JDB as an intermediary between the WB and final beneficiaries, on the basis 
of understanding Japanese commercial practices. It was also committed to focusing only on three key 
sectors: steel, power and transport, in the selection of projects for the inclusion in the lending pro-
gram. The annual meetings were used effectively as the formal communication venue between the WB 
and the Japanese Government. Also key staff of the WB, the Government, the JDB and the final bene-
ficiaries kept constantly in touch and this was a good venue for the informal communication.
With the heavy involvement in lending to the steel and power sectors, the WB did try a new ap-
proach of taking a sector-wide approach in the two sectors. As to steel, the WB challenged the MITI 
on the industry?s tendency for overinvestment on the basis of optimistic steel demand analysis and as 
to power, on setting electricity prices lower than the normally acceptable rates for the healthy manage-
ment of the power companies.
One of the most important contributions made by the WB was the introduction of the formal sys-
tem of preparation of an investment program, a specific project, and specific components of a project 
for financing as a loan. The best example was the preparation of the expressway project between Kobe 
and Nagoya. The whole process was done on the basis of detailed engineering, economic as well as fi-
nancial analysis. The first expressway project between Ritto and Amagasaki was the final product of 
many transport studies between Tokyo and Osaka. The resultant proposal made by the government 
had to be checked. The original design was improved by recommendations made by the consultants 
who were specialists on high-speed motorway design.
ICB was applied to the two transport projects, as one of the ways to reduce the investment costs. The 
application of ICB did not fare well with then existing Japanese system of bidding, which was appar-
ently used to distribute works among bidders widely. It was unfortunate that only one bid, among 
many contract bids, was made by an international contractor.
On the termination of the lending relationship, no economic or any other report available in the Ar-
chives, explicitly analyzed the degree of access of Japanese bonds in the capital markets. In fact, there 
were only one government, two public sector bonds and two steel companies notes issued during the 
three years, 1959?1961. All bonds and notes were issued only in the New York market and Japan was 
not able to raise funds in any other market. There is an obvious question that arises as to whether these 
experiences were good enough to say that Japan had reasonable accessibility to international capital 
markets. In connection with the issue of how to raise extra capital, the WB could have analyzed the 
way to develop a domestic long-term capital market, and to liberalize Japan?s capital market for inter-
national investment. Curiously lacking was the comparative analysis of Japanese per capita GNP or 
GDP with ones of European and other countries. After all, per capita income of Japan was much lower 
than those of European countries, which were then, still borrowers from the WB.
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ANNEX 1.?Japan?s Borrowing from the World Bank, 1958?1961: List of Loans







Loan Amount  
($ Million)/Terms 





01/29/1958 JDB/Kawasaki Steel 
(II)
Construction of new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Chiba plant to increase annual 
production capacity of pig iron to 684,000 tons
8/14 yrs/5?5/8? 20
06/13/1958 JDB/Kansai Electric 
Power (II)
Construction of a 258 Mw hydroelectric installa-
tion with seasonal reservoir control along the 




Construction of a 261 Mw hydroelectric dam along 




Installation of a new blast furnace and blooming 
mill at Wakayama plant
33/15 yrs/5?3/8? 83
08/18/1958 JDB/Kobe Steel Installation of a new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Nadahama plant
10/15 yrs/5?3/8? 36
09/10/1958 JDB/ Chubu 
Electric Power (II)
Construction of two Hatanagi dams, two hydro-
electric power stations, each with 85,000 Kw 
capacity
29/25 yrs/5.75? 73
09/10/1958 JDB/Nippon Kokan 
Steel
Construction of a strip mill and expansion of 
seamless tube mill near Tokyo
22/15 yrs/5.75? 67
02/17/1959 JDB/Electric Power 
Development 
Corporation
Construction of a Miboro reservoir-controlled 
hydroelectric dam with 215 Mw capacity in 
Western main island 
10/25 yrs/5.75? 103
11/12/1959 JDB/Fuji Steel Construction of a new blast furnace and related 
facilities at Hirohata plant
24/15 yrs/6? 203
11/12/1959 JDB/Yawata Steel 
(II)
Construction of two blast furnaces and related 
facilities at Tobata plant
20/15 yrs/6? 244
03/17/1960 Japan Highway 
Public Corporation
Expressway Construction: Ritto?Amagasaki 
Section, 71.5 km
40/23 yrs/6.25? 131
12/20/1960 JDB/Kawasaki  
Steel (III)





Construction of hot strip and plate mill and related 




Construction of the first stage of a steam power 
plant with a capacity of 156 Mw
12/20 yrs/5.75? 28
05/02/1961 Japan National 
Railways
Construction of the New Tokaido Railway Line 80/20 yrs/5.75? 548
11/29/1961 Japan Highway 
Public Corporation 
(II)
Expressway Construction: Ichinomiya?Ritto 
(104 km) & Amagasaki?Nishinomiya (7 km)
40/23 yrs/5.75? 212
Sources: Various Annual, President and Appraisal Reports by the World Bank.
ANNEX 2
Basic Structure of the WB Projects and Loans?
Author?s Note: This Annex summarizes the contents and characteristics of each project/loan based on 
information in the respective President and Appraisal Report and other documents available in WB Ar-
chives. The projects are being presented chronologically. In the end of each project expose, note-worthy 
interactions among WB and Japanese Government as well as final beneficiaries on sector-wide and proj-
ect issues are presented in the form of ?Notes? on the basis of the review of each project folder in the Ar-
chives. Most of the projects were well executed in timely manner within reasonable deviation from origi-
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nal cost estimates. But some had problems and they are described in the ?Notes? below.
In order to save the space of this Annex, ?the? before the formal organization has been cut out. You 
will find WB instead of the WB and JDB instead of the JDB.
Second Kawasaki Steel Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$8.0 million relent to Kawasaki Steel
4. Date of Loan: 01/29/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 14 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?5/8?
7. Project Description: The loan would cover about 40? of the total construction cost, about US$20 
million, of a second blast furnace, a battery of 60 coke ovens and related facilities at Kawaski?s 
Chiba plant near Tokyo. With the completion of the proposed project, Kawasaki?s pig iron pro-
duction capacity would increase from 324,000 to 684,000 tons per annum.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. There was no Project Agree-
ment between WB and Kawasaki, as WB would not have any direct contractual relation with 
Kawasaki. However, JDB entered into a Subsidiary Loan Agreement with Kawasaki and the 
Agreement included relending terms, the limitation of Kawasaki?s cash dividends during the 
project execution period to 5? per annum, the ratio of Kawasaki?s current assets to its current lia-
bilities to be reduced to 1.0, and the total borrowings limited to US$78 million. The Guarantee 
Agreement was in the form similar to the previous Agreement with Japan.
9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and to improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded blast furnace ca-
pacity would make it less dependent on imported scrap. Kawaski?s project was part of this general 
program. The addition of a second blast furnace to Kawasaki?s Chiba plant should lessen its de-
pendence on imported scrap and pig iron, lower its production costs and enable it to increase the 
production of finished products from its rolling facilities.
10. Procurement: Purchases of equipment were made on a competitive basis.
Notes:
On the introduction of the new lending procedures, since this loan was the first one under the new 
lending regime, its President Report explained specifically that: (1) the government planned to borrow 
about US$300 million over the next three years from WB; (2) a great part of this borrowing would be 
for expenditures in Japan; and, (3) external borrowing for foreign exchange expenditures from sources 
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other than the WB would be limited. The economic justification for the loan was based on the need for 
further increase in steel production capacity in Japan as a whole rather than on the fact that the pro-
posed investment would improve the competitive position of the Kawasaki Steel Corporation. This last 
comment was made as WB worried about a possible redundant capacity and/or WB did not want to be 
a part of competition of each steel company fighting for the gain in domestic market share.1
This loan was the first one replacing the Project Agreement between Kawasaki and WB with Subsid-
iary Agreement between JDB and Kawasaki.
On financial covenants, WB became more flexible in dealing with the Kawasaki than before after 
observing Kawasaki?s competent business execution since the first loan was made. There were major 
changes in financial conditions attached to the new loan in comparison with the last loan. Essentially 
Kawasaki?s improved financial position and good prospects no longer justified the continuation of the 
elaborate protective arrangements in force under the first loan. For comparison concerning Kawasaki?s 
financial arrangements between the old and the new, please see Annex 8 ?Present and Proposed Pro-
tective Financial Arrangements? of the Appraisal Report on the Kawasaki Steel Corporation, Blast Fur-
nace Project, January 20, 1958.
On the over-capacity of the steel industry, two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects 
including the Kawasaki II project dated April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 well captured the serious 
problem on the over-capacity of the steel industry, and each company?s financial issues which started 
in 1962.2 The issues were discussed as the sector problems in the main text.
Second Kansai Electric Power Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$37 million relent to Kansai Power Company (Kansai)
4. Date of Loan: 06/13/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 25 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/8?
7. Project Description: The project consisted of the construction of hydroelectric installations on the 
Kurobe River in the central range of the Japanese Alps. It included the construction of: the dam, a 
double curvature arch structure, of about 188 meters high; an underground power station 
equipped with three generating units, rated at 86 Mw each and of the required substation facili-
ties. The total cost was estimated at $118 million and WB loan covered foreign exchange cost of 
about US$6.7 million and local cost of about US$ 30.3 million.
 1 Vide Memorandum, SLC/M/687, Staff Loan Committee, Minutes of Staff Loan Committee Meeting held on Friday, November 
29, 1957, Japan-Kawasaki Steel (02) Project Folder # 1857738, WB Archives.
 2 Memorandum, Gunther Mehlem to Mr. W. J. Armstrong, Back-to-Office Report-End Use, Loans to Six Japanese Steel Compa-
nies, April 6, 1964, and Memorandum, David Peacock to Mr. van Hoffman, Loans to Six Japanese Steel Companies, February 
10, 1967, Japan-General-Steel Folder # 1857433, WB Archives.
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8. Security: No provision was made for WB to receive from JDB the security which JDB would re-
ceive from Kansai. WB would obtain from JDB a negative pledge clause in the usual form.
9. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. There was no Project Agree-
ment between WB and Kansai, as WB would not have any direct contractual relation with Kansai. 
Instead JDB entered into a Subsidiary Loan Agreement with Kansai Power corresponding in sub-
stance to the terms of the WB?s Project Agreement and the Subsidiary Agreement included re-
lending terms, the limitation of Kansai?s consolidated indebtedness not exceeding twice its consol-
idated capital and surplus. The Guarantee Agreement conformed with to the normal pattern of 
the WB?s guarantee agreements, and it included the provision that the Government of Japan 
would covenant to maintain electricity rates at such level as will allow Kansai to finance adequate 
to meet power requirements in its area.
10. Justification: The power supply situation in Japan even after major improvement lacked needed 
amount of reserve capacity. While the power industry would have to develop thermal facilities, 
the limited number of and high cost of hydroelectric resources remaining to be developed. 
Among the hydroelectric sites remaining to be developed in Japan, the Kurobe project was con-
sidered by WB one of the most desirable from engineering and economic point of view.
11. Procurement: Purchases of equipment was made on a competitive basis.
Notes:
On WB?s approach on the power sector issues, since this project was the first one out of the four hy-
droelectric projects under consideration by WB for its financing, WB wanted to discuss with the rep-
resentative of the Government on: (1) basic power rate policy of the Government to allow for a major 
share of cost of future expansion to be met out of companies internal resources; (2) the Government 
policy regarding the appraisal of economic merits of hydroelectric projects as compared to practical al-
ternative power sources; and, (3) the proposed reorganization of local dispatching system among the 
different power companies.3
During negotiations, these issues were discussed with the Government to conclude that: On the re-
organization, it became clear that the proposed reorganization of the private companies and the Elec-
tric Power Development Company (EPDC) would result in considerable savings in production but 
neither the corporate structure nor the independence of the power companies would be affected; On 
the methods of appraisal of hydro projects, WB realized that the Government knew the need of consis-
tent application of existing standards for appraising; On the future rate policy, the unsatisfactory fea-
 3 Vide Memorandum, N. R. Chakravarti, to Files, Japan-Kansai Electric Power Development Project (Second Loan), March 11, 
1958, and Memorandum, SLC/O/938, Department of Operations, Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Application for a 
Loan Equivalent US$37 million to the Japan Development Bank for the Kansai Electric Power company, Inc., Match 25, 1958, 
Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857745, WB Archives.
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tures of the pricing system were described in paragraphs 51?53 of the Appraisal Report and the ex-
pected deterioration of Kansai?s financial position which was clearly shown in paragraphs 83 and 84. 
During negotiations, the Government explained to WB that it had formed a committee of experts to 
consider the problem and to recommend of its solutions. The Government?s commitment to work on 
the issues was made in the letter to WB.4
On the financial conditions, the WB revised financial and investment conditions attached with the 
first Kansai loan of 1953. WB?s views on Kansai changed dramatically. According to the Loan Com-
mittee Memorandum dated March 25, 1958 written before loan negotiations, WB did not have doubts 
that WB previously felt about Japanese policy in respect of power development and Kansai?s capability 
to manage a much lager investment program than the project itself. WB therefore did not seek any un-
dertakings from either the Government or JDB to make available extra funds for the project if needed. 
(Ibid., Footnote 3 above)
On the interactions between WB and Kansai, there were intensive engineering interventions by WB 
during the implementation of the construction of Kurobe Dam. Kansai Power reported in October 
1959 to WB the need to revise the design of the dam and its cost estimate of the construction of the 
dam after three years of its construction, due to unexpectedly poor geological conditions and other 
difficulties needing possible design changes.5 In the process of ascertaining the location and the design 
of the dam, and because of concern over the news of the Malpasset arch dam failure in southern 
France in December 1959, WB decided to look into the whole issue of the geology of the dam site with 
the help of the international consultants (Board) consisting of dam designers and geological special-
ists. Reviewing their reports and their discussions among WB, Kansai, the Board and Kansai Power?s 
Consultant (Electroconsult), the review started in January 1960. After its field visit, the Board initially 
concluded that the quality was not satisfactory for the construction of a thin arch dam above elevation 
1,400 meters. The type of rock between elevation 1,400 meters and 1,454 meters (top the dam) was en-
tirely inadequate to carry the loads that would be required for the thin arch structure as designed. The 
abutment rocks above elevation 1,400 were deeply weathered and were cut by several major shear or 
fault zones in each abutment. Moreover, the thickness of the supporting abutment rock did not appear 
sufficient to carry the loads for the construction of the dam as designed above an elevation of about 
1,400 meters.6 Kansai officials were unhappy to hear a possible reduction in the height of the dam as 
they had constructed the major part of the right abutment wing wall as well as the inclined concrete 
structure for their power intake. Kansai?s solutions by keeping the original dam design with various re-
 4 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/949, Department of Operations, Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Kansai Power project, 
May 27, 1958 and Letter from Shigesaburo Maeo, Minister of International Trade and Industry to Eugine R. Black, President 
of the WB, May 27, 1958. Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857745, WB Archives.
 5 Letter, Yoshishige Ashihara to the World Bank, ?Loan No. 196 JA,? October 28, 1959, Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder 
# 1857746, WB Archives.
 6 Vide the initial report of the Board. The International Board of Consultants to the World Bank, Report on the Kurobe Dam, 
An Appraisal of the Suitability of the Project Site for the Construction of the Proposed Thin Arch Dam, May 26, 1960, 
Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857747, WB Archives.
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medial works were reviewed and tested step by step. Main issues were strength of right and left banks, 
remedial treatment of weak zones of left and right banks, consolidation of grouting and curtain grout-
ing, rock drains, the installation of measuring devices and determination of the height of the dam and 
filling of the water reservoir. As each of the problems was solved, the height of the dam and the filling 
of the water reservoir increased and eventually reached the levels originally designed and filling of the 
water reservoir, some 1,440 meters.7 The last meeting of WB, Kansai, the Board and Electroconsult 
was held in November/December 1966 and it ascertained the ability of Kansai to manage the whole is-
sues of safety of Kurobe Dam.8
Hokuriku Electric Power Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$25 million relent to Hokuriku Power Company (Hokuriku)
4. Date of Loan: 06/27/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 25 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/8?
7. Project Description: The project consisted of the construction of the Arimine dam of which sea-
sonal reservoir at about 1,000 meters above sea level would be utilized in successive falls along the 
Joganji river in the western part of Honshu on the Sea of Japan. In addition, included were the in-
stallation of six power generating stations, one of which was an extension of the existing plant. Al-
together, the project would add 261 Mw to the system. The amount of the loan would represent 
about 27? of the total cost of the project and the entire amount of the loan was expected to cover 
domestic expenditures.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. The JDB entered into a Sub-
sidiary Loan Agreement with Hokuriku corresponding in substance to the terms of the WB?s 
Loan Agreement and the agreements included relending terms, the limitation of Hokuriku?s con-
solidated indebtedness not exceeding twice its consolidated capital and surplus. The Guarantee 
Agreement conformed to the normal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and it included 
the provision that the Government covenanted to maintain electricity rates at such level as will al-
 7 There are many reports and memoranda on the subject and the list thereof is available in Memorandum, E. A. Minnig to 
Charles H. White, Japan?Loan 196-JA Kurobe Dam, Resume of Activities of the International Board of Consultants, July 27, 
1966, Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857749, WB Archives.
 8 Memorandum, Mario Piccagli to Files, Japan?Loan 196-JA-Kurobe Dam?Meeting of the Board of Consultants, December 
14, 1966, Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857750, WB Archives. Available information in the Archives indicates 
that even in 1967, WB continued to analyze the results of measurements and made observation that the measurement results 
looked satisfactory behavior of the dam and its foundation except the movement of the left abutment. Vide Memorandum, E. 
A. Minnig to A. David Knox, Japan?Loan 196-JA Kurobe Dam, September 5, 1967, Memorandum, E. A. Minnig to A. David 
Knox, Japan-Loan 196-JA Kurobe Dam, September 5, 1967, Japan-Kansai Power Project (02) Folder # 1857750, WB Archives.
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low Hokuriku to finance adequate to meet power requirements in its area.
9. Justification: The return on the project was estimated at 15? on the basis of its comparison with 
an alternative modern thermal power plan with 260 Mw operating at a 50? load factor due main-
ly to the costly imported fuel. This return was considered as unquestionable economic advantage 
to Hokuriku Power.
10. Procurement: Purchases of equipment were made on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Hokuriku was a medium-sized company with total assets of about $150 million operated an exclu-
sively hydroelectric system in the western part of the main island on the coast of the Japan Sea around 
the city of Toyama. The project was part of Hokuriku?s hydroelectric expansion program and it repre-
sented about 47? of the additional capacity and its cost represented about 30? of the total cost of the 
expansion program. Since the project represented a large part of Hokuriku?s expansion program, WB 
wanted JDB?s funding commitment to complete the project if necessary and WB planned to put this 
commitment in the Guarantee Agreement.9 During loan negotiations, the Government strongly ob-
jected to this type of commitment for the benefit of private companies, such as Hokuriku. WB in the 
end agreed to omit the proposed covenant from the Guarantee Agreement. The Government made its 
commitment in the form of a letter to WB saying that JDB would have no difficulty in carrying out its 
obligation regarding the provision of necessary funds to Hokuriku.10
Sumitomo Metal Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$33.0 million relent to Sumitomo Metal Industries (Sumitomo)
4. Date of Loan: 07/11/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/8?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a program for the modernization and expansion of 
production facilities in Sumitomo?s four plants at Wakayama, Osaka, Amagasaki and Kokura. The 
program was designed to increase Sumitomo?s annual production capacity to about 825,000 tons 
of pig iron, 1,450,000 of steel ingots, and 1,334,000 tons of finished and semi-finished steel prod-
ucts. The project consisted of the installation and operation of a blast furnace and blooming mill 
at Wakayama and included: the construction of harbor facilities to receive ships up to 15,000 tons; 
 9 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/942, Department of Operations, Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Hokuriku Project, April 
25, 1958 and Memorandum, SLC/M/708, Minutes of Staff Loan Committee held o May 1, 1958, May 13, 1958, Japan-Hoku-
riku Project Folder # 1857753, WB Archives.
10 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/954, Department of Operations, Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Hokuriku Project, 
June17, 1958, Japan-Hokuriku Project Folder # 1857753, WB Archives.
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the construction of blast furnace with a daily capacity of 1,000 tons of pig iron, 57 coke ovens and 
by-products plant; the remodeling of three open hearth furnaces to increase the annual capacity 
of the steel plant to 630,000 tons; the construction of a 47? blooming mill; and, all auxiliary facili-
ties for these plants. The entire project was scheduled for completion by March 1962 at an esti-
mated cost of $83 million and the WB?s loan would finance about 40? of the total cost of the 
project. About US$3.6 million would finance imported equipment and services and the remain-
der, domestic expenditures in Japan.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between WB and Japan, and a Subsidiary Loan Agree-
ment between JDB and Sumitomo. The Subsidiary Agreement included relending terms, the ratio 
of consolidated indebtedness to consolidated capital and surplus in a ratio higher than 60 : 40 be-
fore March 31, 1963 or 55 : 45 thereafter, and the limitation of short and long-term borrowings as 
well as bond placements, all up to March 31, 1962. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form 
similar to previous Agreements with Japan.
9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded iron-making facili-
ties would make it less dependent on imported scrap. The completion of the project would in-
crease efficiency and reduce costs of production of finished products thus improving Sumitomo?s 
competitive position in the export market.
10. Procurement: Both Japanese and imported equipment was purchase on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Before the start of negotiations of the Sumitomo loan, there was an important decision made within 
WB on who should be preparing the draft of the Subsidiary Loan Agreement, WB or JDB. Although 
the Subsidiary Loan Agreement was between JDB and the ultimate beneficiary of the loan, WB staff 
had prepared the preliminary draft of the Subsidiary Loan Agreement and WB thought that it should 
be the job of JDB and the ultimate beneficiary. The Working Party met end of April 1958 to discuss the 
advisability of discontinuing the practice. The conclusion was that JDB and the recipient would draft a 
loan agreement and during the negotiations WB would give draft of all stipulations considered essen-
tial for inclusion in the Subsidiary Loan Agreement. This was part of procedural changes giving more 
responsibility to the Japanese party.11
After reviewing a couple of drafts on ?Study of the Japanese Steel Market,? WB finally completed the 
report to present to the Board as part of the set of documents on the proposed loan to JDB for the Su-
11 Vide Memorandum, R. F. Quandt to Members Japanese Working Party, Japan-Sumitomo Project?Procedures in Respect of 
the Subsidiary Loan Agreement, April 30, 1958 and Memorandum, N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan-Sumitomo Steel Proj-
ect-Subsidiary Loan Agreement, May 7, 1958, Japan-Sumitomo Project Folder # 1857757, WB Archives.
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mitomo project. WB thought that such a report was necessary in view of heavy commitment in the 
steel industry in a short span of time. The contents of the report were the Japanese program for the ex-
pansion of iron and steel making capacity and the forecast of demand for 1957/62, the evaluation of 
the forecasts, and the prospects of demand and supply.12 All appraisal reports of subsequent steel proj-
ects have a section and an annex on the steel market.
Two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects including this Sumitomo project dated 
April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 well captured the serious problem on the over-capacity of the steel 
industry, and each company?s financial problems which started in 1962. The issues are discussed as the 
steel sector problems in the main text.
Kobe Steel Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$10.0 million relent to Kobe Steel
4. Date of Loan: 08/18/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/8?
7. Project Description: The project was the major part of a three-year program for the expansion 
and modernization of Kobe Steel?s production facilities in the city of Kobe. The program was de-
signed to give Kobe?s capacity to produce pig iron (288,000 tons per year) and to increase its an-
nual production capacity to about 700,000 tons of ingot steel and about 600,000 tons of saleable 
products. The project consisted of the installation of a blast furnace and related facilities at Nada-
hama and Wakinohama and included the construction of harbor facilities; the installation of raw 
material yard sintering plant; the construction of blast furnace with a daily output of 800 tons of 
pig iron and of auxiliary facilities; the installation of a power plant at Nadahama; and the installa-
tion of steel making plants and ancillary facilities at Wakinohama. The project was scheduled for 
completion by July 1959 at an estimated cost of $36 million. The WB?s loan would finance about 
40? of the total mostly for expenditures in Japan but about $0.6 million would be used for pay-
ment of imported equipment and services.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between WB and Japan, and a Subsidiary Loan Agree-
ment between JDB and Kobe Steel. JDB entered into a Subsidiary Loan Agreement with Kobe and 
the agreements included relending terms, the limitation of Kobe?s additional indebtedness keep-
ing debt/equity ratio less than 50 : 50, and the limitation of Kobe Steel?s new investment, during 
12 Vide Memorandum, N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan-Draft Study of the Japanese Steel Market (Sumitomo), May 7, 1958, 
Japan-Sumitomo Project Folder # 1857757, WB Archives and Japan: Sector Report?Japanese Steel Market Prospects, 1957, 
June 24, 1958, Report No. TO-178, the World Bank.
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the construction period (to April 1, 1960) in shares of other companies or in new loans to other 
enterprises upto ?350 million. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to previous 
Agreement with Japan.
9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded iron-making facili-
ties would make it less dependent on imported scrap. The completion of the project would in-
crease efficiency and reduce costs of production of finished products thus improving Kobe?s com-
petitive position in the export and domestic markets.
10. Procurement: Both Japanese and imported equipment was purchased on a competitive basis.
Notes:
One problem required special attention was that of protecting Kobe?s financial position from a pos-
sible strain of its resources by two of its principal subsidiaries, the Amagasaki Steel and the Amagasaki 
Iron and Steel Company. While the two companies made some technical progress with good business 
results since they became Kobe?s subsidiaries in 1954, their capital structure was weak and they were 
financing capital investments with short-term debts. In addition to provisions of the Subsidiary Loan 
Agreement limiting Kobe?s freedom to incur additional indebtedness during the construction period, 
satisfactory assurances were received from Kobe and the two other principal stockholders (Sanwa and 
Kobe Banks) of these subsidiaries that a sound financing plan for these two subsidiaries was to be put 
into effect as soon as practicable and that they would refrain from embarking on the construction of 
any major new facilities until financial arrangements satisfactory to JDB and WB were made.13
According to the Follow-up Report dated July 14, 1966 prepared by a staff of International Finance 
Corporation, ?Kobe?s financial position has deteriorated steadily during the past four years. Although 
there is no current ratio requirement in the loan agreement, the ratio of 1.35 compares unfavorably 
with the 1.50 required of other companies. The debt/equity ratio has deteriorated steadily and is cur-
rently 59.9 : 40.1 as against required ratio of 50 : 50. This requirement has been waived until July 31, 
1966, and as yet JDB has made no recommendations about a further waiver of this requirement.?14
Two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects dated April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 
well captured the serious problem on the over-capacity of the steel industry, and each company?s fi-
nancial problems which started in 1962. The issues are discussed as the steel sector problems in the 
main text.
13 Vide Appraisal Report on Japan, Kobe Steel-Blast Furnace Project, July 28, 1958, pp. 16?18.
14 Vide David Peacock, the Follow-up Report dated July 14, 1966, p. 3, Japan-Kobe Steel Project Folder # 1857767, WB Archives.
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Second Chubu (Hatanagi) Electric Power Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$29 million relent to Chubu Power Company (Chubu)
4. Date of Loan: 09/10/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 25 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project consisted of the construction of two new power stations, Hatan-
agi No. 1 and No. 2, on the Ohi River in central Honshu, with a generating capacity of 85 Mw each 
to supply electricity to the customers of Chubu including ones in the Nagoya area. The project in-
cluded the construction of a hollow concrete gravity dam, 119 meters high, which would im-
pound 107 million cubic meters of water. Hatanagi No. 1 power station would be located near the 
foot of the dam, while Hatanagi No. 2, further downstream. The discharge of Hatanagi No. 1 
would be stored in a regulating pond created by the building of another smaller dam downstream. 
A pressure tunnel from the pond would supply water to Hatanagi No. 2 power station. The two 
turbine-generator units in Hatanagi No. 1 power station would be so designed and installed that 
they could also be operated as motor?pump units for pumping water back to the reservoir at 
night. This feature would extend the duration of peak operation for Hatanagi No. 1 and would 
also contribute to the more efficient use of large thermal units added to the Chubu system. The 
Hatanagi project would cost $73 million and the WB loan of US$29 million was to finance 40? of 
the total cost and most of the loan was to finance local cost expenditures.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. The JDB entered into a Sub-
sidiary Loan Agreement with Chubu and the agreements included relending terms, the limitation 
of Chubu?s consolidated indebtedness not exceeding twice its consolidated capital and surplus. 
The Guarantee Agreement conforms with to the normal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agree-
ments, and it included the provision that the Government covenanted to maintain electricity rates 
so as to allow Chubu to finance adequate investment to meet power requirements in its area.
9. Justification: The return on the project was estimated at 10? on the basis of its comparison with 
an alternative modern thermal power plant depending on the costly imported fuel. This return 
was considered as clearly economic advantage to Chubu.
10. Procurement: Purchases were made on a competitive basis.
Notes:
The Chubu was well considered by WB and the project was prepared properly. Above all, the elec-
tricity demand was increasing at the rate higher than national average. The only note worthy discus-
sion between the Government and WB was on the Government?s rate policy. During the negotiations 
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for the Chubu Power Project the question arose whether Chubu could have satisfactory assurances that 
during the construction period it would be able to raise enough funds required for its expansion pro-
gram. The WB?s proposal was that JDB should enter into a back-stop commitment in favor of Chubu, 
similar to the one JDB had given to Hokuriku and that JDB?s undertaking should be supported, like in 
the Hokuriku case, by a goodwill declaration of the Japanese Government. On this proposal, JDB and 
Chubu counter-argued that a back-stop commitment by JDB would adversely affect Chubu?s credit 
standing in the Japanese market and might create difficulties in the raising of the funds. Since Chubu 
ranks amongst the three biggest power companies in Japan, its credit rating was equal to that of Kansai 
or Tokyo Power and a back-stop could be interpreted as a lack of confidence by WB in Chubu?s man-
agement. In the end, WB dropped this proposal. In fact, WB maintained the position on the rate issue 
not as one of each power company but as the industry as a whole requiring substantial capital to im-
plement large scale expansion programs by the power companies. In view of the certainty that the ex-
pansion program would become a continuous necessity, WB was drawing the Government attention to 
the need of a revision of the basic principle of its power rate policy. Because of this urging, the Minis-
ter of MITI wrote a letter dated May 27, 1958 to WB agreeing with WB the need of review of rate poli-
cy and appointed a special committee to study, and report on the ways and means in which the reve-
nues of the power companies could be increased. The Minister?s letter mentioned that the committee?s 
recommendations would be available by the latter part of 1958 and it would be in the position to take 
the first steps towards remedying the revenue situation of the power companies in the early part of 
1959.15
Nippon Kokan Steel Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$22.0 million relent to Nippon Kokan Steel (Nippon Kokan)
4. Date of Loan: 09/10/1958
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a plan for the modernization and expansion of Nip-
pon Kokan?s production facilities, to increase Nippon Kokan?s annual productive capacity to 
about 1.5 million tons of pig iron, about 2.3 million tons of steel ingot and about 2.3 million tons 
of finished and semi-finished products. The entire expansion program for April 1957 to March 
1961 would cost about US$129 million. The project, costing an estimated US$67 million, consist-
ed of the construction of a steel plant and of the expansion of a seamless tube mill at Mizue in the 
city of Kawasaki. The project included specifically the construction and installation of steel mak-
15 Vide Memorandum, R. F. Quandt to Files, Japan-Chubu Power Project?Rate Policy, September 16, 1958, Japan-Chubu-Ha-
tanagi Hydroelectric Project Folder # 1857772, WB Archives. 
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ing plant, slabbing mill, hot rolling mill, cold rolling mill and related facilities such as power facili-
ties, water supply and transportation. It also included the installation of a upsetter and X-ray wall 
thickness measuring gauge for the expansion of a seamless tube mill. The loan financed all im-
ported equipments for the Mizue plant and for the second stage of seamless tube mill.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. JDB entered into a Subsidiary 
Loan Agreement with Nippon Kokan and the agreements included relending terms, the limitation 
of Nippon Kokan?s additional indebtedness keeping debt/equity ratio less than 60 : 40 during the 
construction period and 50 : 50 after its completion, and the limitation of Nippon Kokan?s new 
investment, during the construction period ending March 31, 1961. Also included was that Nip-
pon Kokan would make arrangements for raising necessary funds to meet its financial require-
ments during the construction period. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to pre-
vious Agreement with Japan.
9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded iron-making facili-
ties would make it less dependent on imported scrap. The completion of the project would in-
crease efficiency and reduce costs of production of finished products thus improving Nippon Ko-
kan?s competitive position in the export and domestic markets.
10. Procurement: Imported equipment was purchased on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Immediately after the loan negotiations in September 1957 but before its Board presentation, WB 
asked Nippon Kokan the contents of foreign investment that the company was making. Nippon Kokan 
answered that they concerned the acquisition of raw materials, the promotion of sales ad the acquisi-
tion of capital for investment within the company. The WB raised this point for a possible question by 
WB?s Board on ?the WB is financing foreign exchange while Nippon Kokan is investing a sizable 
amount of foreign exchange outside of Japan.?16
According to the End-Use Mission Report dated April 22, 1964, the last report on this project avail-
able in the Archives, Nippon Kokan?s financial situation revealed in April 1963 that it would not attain 
the debt/equity ratio of 50 : 50 on April 1964 as required by the amended Loan Agreement. As a result, 
WB, JDB and Nippon Kokan agreed formally to a waiver of the 50 : 50 ratio until March 31, 1967. Nip-
pon Kokan undertook to attain the target ratio by making two share offerings. In addition, they agreed 
to limit heir capital expenditures for four years to stipulated amounts.17 
16 Vide Memorandum, R. F. Quandt to Files, Japan-Investment Policy of the Japan Steel & Tube Corporation Ltd. (Nippon Ko-
kan), September 8, 1958, Japan-Nippon Kokan Project Folder # 1857778, WB Archives.
17 Vide Memorandum, Gunter Mehlem, April 22, 1964, Japan-Nippon Kokan Project Folder # 1857782, WB Archives. 
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Two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects dated April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 
well captured the serious problem of the over-capacity of the steel industry, and each company?s finan-
cial problems which started in 1962. The issues are discussed as the steel sector problems in the main 
text.
Miboro Hydroelectric Power Project of the Electric Power Development Company (EPDC)
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$10 million relent to Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) (Jointly fi-
nanced by the Government bond, $30 million, issued in the New York market)
4. Date of Loan: 02/17/1959
5. Terms of Loan: 5 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project consisted of the construction of two new power stations having 
215 Mw capacity on the Sho River in Toyama/Gifu in western Honshu to cater to the customers of 
Kansai Electric Power. The project included the construction of a rockfill dam, about 130 m high, 
capable of impounding about 330 million cubic meters of water storage, an underground power 
station at the same site comprising the two generating units discharging into the Sho River 
through a 8.8 km tunnel, and a step-up substation to handle the output of the power station locat-
ed on the downstream of the dam. Construction of the Miboro dam started in June 1957 at a total 
estimated cost of $103 million. By December 1958, about half of the work was completed and the 
loan would finance part of the remaining costs including some foreign exchange requirements, 
about US$1 million. This Loan was made in a combined operation with the Japanese Government 
bonds (US$30 million) issued in the NY financial market.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were Loan Agreement between WB 
and JDB, Subsidiary Loan Agreement between JDB and EPDC, Project Agreement between the 
WB and EPDC, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. The Loan Agreement con-
formed generally to the pattern of previous loan agreements with JDB and contained among oth-
ers delivery of payment for US$15 million principal amount of 15-year sinking-fund bonds of the 
market issue by the Government of Japan. The Subsidiary Agreement conformed to the pattern of 
previous subsidiary agreements. The Project Agreement gave WB direct relationship with EPDC 
and included obligations concerning the Project implementation. Specifically EPDC was required 
to set the selling prices of electricity at such levels as gross revenues at least covering operating 
costs and a reasonable return on the proper value of the total assets. The Guarantee Agreement 
conformed with the normal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and it included the provi-
sion that the Government was covenanted to provide to EPDC on reasonable terms with any 
funds required to complete the project.
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9. Justification: The return on the project was estimated at 7? on the basis of its comparison with an 
alternative modern thermal power plant depending on the costly imported fuel. This return was 
considered as economic advantage to EPDC.
10. Procurement: Purchases were made on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Out of four power projects proposed by Japan applying for possible borrowing from WB in Septem-
ber 1957, the two loans, Kansai and Hokuriku, were already approved by WB and one, Chubu loan was 
being processed without major issues. One remaining project was one of EPDC?s, a Government 
owned and controlled agency. EPDC was established in 1952 to develop bulk supplies of power to be 
sold wholesale to the privately owned power companies. EPDC was then carrying out a program 
which by 1962 would make available about 2,000 Mw of which 532 Mw had been commissioned as of 
September 1957. The three largest projects then under construction in the program were the Okutada-
mi, Tagokura and Miboro projects and the total cost of these facilities was estimated at about $330 mil-
lion. EPDC applied for loans to these three projects totaling about $85 million and for a further loan of 
about $10 million to be applied against the construction of transmission and substation facilities relat-
ed to the first two of the three projects. The main problems for WB to consider before arriving at a de-
cision on the choice of a project out of the three and whether to lend to EPDC were: (1) institutional 
issues: the fact that EPDC was owned and controlled by the Government and the resulting subsidiza-
tion aspects and that EPDC should limit itself to generating power from its facilities and selling it to its 
customers at the generating plan, without engaging in the construction and operation of transmission 
facilities; (2) the high cost of power provided by EPDC and the related question of economic justifica-
tion; and, (3) EPDC?s financial policies and of its financial conditions. Assuming that these issues were 
to be overcome, WB staff chose Miboro on the basis of comparing cost at stepdown substation mils/
kwh of Kurobe (12 cent), Okutadami (20.7), Tagokura (18.5) and Miboro (16.9).18 As WB combed 
through the above issues, and on the basis of the revised investment program for 1962?1968, much 
smaller than the original, and the positive sign of the continued improvement of EPDC?s operations, 
WB proceeded with the preparation of the Miboro Project.19
WB initially planned to lend directly to EPDC, but WB found that there would be substantial legal is-
sues to make a loan directly to EPDC. To change this by new legislation would take a long time and WB 
changed in December 1958 its course to lend to EPDC through JDB. The timing of this decision was im-
portant as the Japanese Government was then pursuing the possibility of a market issue in the New York 
market. The lending to EPDC through JDB also influenced the framework of legal agreement to have 
traditional Project Agreement between WB and EPDC instead of Subsidiary Agreement between JDB 
18 Vide Memorandum, from Mario Piccagli and J. Filippi to Files, Japan-Proposed Loans to EPDC dated April 17, 1958, 
Japan-Miboro Project Folder # 1857789, WB Archives.
19 Vide pp. 1?4, Appraisal Report on Japan, Miboro Hydroelectric Project of the EPDC, December 28, 1958, the World Bank.
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and EPDC. Due to the possible joint financing operations, WB decided to take up this project even 
though WB?s principle approach was to defer further lending to the power projects after the Chubu until 
the government took action to strengthen the financial position of the power companies.20
The proposed loan to EPDC in conjunction with an issue of bonds in New York by the Government 
of Japan had to face with a new type of varying problems. For example, in order to coordinate prepara-
tory works between WB and the First Boston Corporation (FBC), they met frequently and discussed 
possible problems such as issues needing coordination of relative stipulations in the WB?s loan docu-
ments and in the agreements and prospectus of FBC. Typical examples were negative pledge stipula-
tions, prepayments and cancellations. Besides these legal issues, WB supplied to FBC basic economic 
and project information for the ease of drafting documents by FBC.21
Fuji Iron and Steel CO. Hirohata Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$24.0 million relent to Fuji Steel
4. Date of Loan: 11/12/1959
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 6?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a plan for the modernization and expansion of Fuji 
Steel?s production facilities during the period, April 1959?March 1962, to increase its annual pro-
ductive capacity from 2.65 to about 3.3 million tons of pig iron, from 3 million tons to 3.75 mil-
lion tons of steel ingot. The entire expansion program would cost about $203 million. The project, 
costing an estimated US$73 million, consisted of the construction of a steel plant and of the ex-
pansion of a seamless tube mill at Hirohata, Hyogo Prefecture. The project included the construc-
tion and installation of blast furnace, sintering plant, coke oven plant, slabbing mill, and related 
facilities. The loan financed all imported equipment, amounting to about US$7.2 million and 
about 27? of the local expenditures on the project.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB, and a Subsidiary Loan Agreement 
between JDB and Fuji Steel. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement included relending terms, the limita-
tion of Fuji Steel?s additional indebtedness keeping debt/equity ratio less than 60/40 before end 
March 1964 and 50/50 thereafter, and the requirement by Fuji Steel to maintain a current ratio of at 
least 1.5 : 1. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to previous Agreement with Japan.
20 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/980, Department of Operations, Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Miboro Power Project, 
December 17, 1958, Japan-Miboro Project Folder # 1857789, WB Archives.
21 Vide Memorandum, Richard F. Quandt to Files, Japan-Discussions with First Boston Corporation on the Coordination of 
their Proposed Public Issue of Japanese Government Bonds and the Bank?s Proposed Loan for the Miboro Project of the Elec-
tric Power Resources Development Corporation, November 3, 1958, Japan-Miboro Project Folder # 1857789, WB Archives.
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9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded iron-making facili-
ties would make it less dependent on imported scrap. The Fuji Steel?s project was a part of the 
overall program and to increase its production capacity of plates and sheets.
10. Procurement: Imported equipment was purchased on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Fuji and Yawata Steel projects were not included in the original list submitted to Mr. Black by the Fi-
nance Minister in September 1957, but later the Government wanted to add these two in the lending 
program. For the Government probably felt the fact that government did let Fuji to borrow $10.3 mil-
lion and Yawata, $26 million, from US Export?Import Bank might complicate the discussion on the 
lending program as WB was trying to limit foreign exchange borrowing of Japan from other institu-
tion. WB eventually agreed to include them in the lending program.22
During negotiations, the major issues discussed were related to the financial covenants and their 
format of presentation. On the debt/equity ratio as above was not a big issue but current ratio was. In 
order to protect the company?s liquidity, WB agreed with Fuji/Yawata to limit cash dividends so as to 
keep the current ratio (after excluding short-term debt) of at least 1.5 : 1 during the life of the WB 
loan. Also Fuji/Yawata?s working liquidity would be kept adequate if short-term loans refinanced peri-
odically were covered by a backstop agreement. The current ratio agreement was incorporated in the 
Subsidiary Agreement and letters from Fuji/Yawata were prepared on financial arrangement regarding 
refinancing of short-term debts and the backstop arrangements.23
Two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects dated April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 
well captured the serious problem of the over-capacity of the steel industry, and each company?s financial 
problems that started in 1962. The issues are discussed as the steel sector problems in the main text.
It is interesting to note that WB received a letter from JDB informing that the planned merger of 
Fuji and Yawata had been disclosed on April 17, 1968. According to the letter, the decision for the 
merger was due mainly to developments in international economic and industrial conditions which 
might put the Japanese industry in difficulties and domestic market condition of steel products where 
dumping prevails.24
22 Memorandum, Martin M. Rosen to Mr. Daividson Sommers, Japan-Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel, January 22, 1958, and N. R. 
Chakravaski to Files, Japan-Yawata Iron and Steel Project?Technical Report, October 7, 1959, Japan-Nippon Steel Project-Ta-
bata Project Folder # 1878742, WB Archives. 
23 Memorandum, N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan-Yawata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.-Second Negotiations (Meetings on October 
21, 22 and 23, 1959), October 28, 1959 and N. R. Chakravarti to Files, Japan-Yawata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.-Second Negotia-
tions (Meeting on October 26, 1959), October 28, 1959, Japan-Nippon Steel Project-Tabata project Folder # 1878742, WB Ar-
chives. 
24 Letter, Seiyo Soejima, Chief, Foreign Department, JDB to Mr. I.P. M. Cargill, Director, Asia Department, WB, A Plan of Yawa-
ta and Fuji Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., May 2, 1968, Japan-General-Steel Folder # 1878740, WB Archives.
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Yawata Iron and Steel CO. Tobata Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$20.0 million relent to Yawata Steel (Yawata)
4. Date of Loan: 11/12/1959
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 6?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a plan for the modernization and expansion of Yawa-
ta Steel?s production facilities during the period, April 1959?March 1962, to increase its annual 
productive capacity from 2.1 to about 3.4 million tons of pig iron, from 2.8 million tons to 5.25 
million tons of ingot steel. The entire expansion program would cost about US$244 million. The 
project, costing an estimated US$167 million, consisted of the construction and installation of two 
blast furnaces, a sintering plant, two coke oven plants and coal washing plants, three converters, a 
slabbing mill, and related facilities at Tobata in Kyushu. The loan financed all imported equip-
ments, amounting to about US$5.7 million and about 16? of the local expenditures on the proj-
ect.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB, and a Subsidiary Loan Agree-
ment between JDB and Yawata. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement included relending terms, the 
limitation of Yawata?s additional indebtedness keeping debt/equity ratio less than 60/40 before 
end March 1964 or 50/50 thereafter, and the requirement by Yawata to maintain a current ration 
of at least 1.5 : 1. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to previous Agreement with 
Japan.
9. Justification: The steel industry in Japan as a whole was making extra efforts to reduce production 
cost and improve its quality to satisfy domestic demand and exports. One of the principle issues 
was how to cope with fluctuating raw material supply and costs. The expanded iron-making facili-
ties would make it less dependent on imported scrap. The Fuji?s project was a part of the overall 
program and to increase its production capacity of plates and sheets.
10. Procurement: Imported equipment was purchase on a competitive basis.
Notes:
Please see the Notes under Fuji Steel Project. Yawata?s case was similar to Fuji?s.
Nihon Road Kodan Amagasaki-Ritto Expressway Project
1. Borrower: Nihon Doro Kodan (Japan Highway Public Corporation (Kodan))
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$40 million
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4. Date of Loan: 03/17/1960
5. Terms of Loan: 23 years
6. Interest Rate: 6?1/4?
7. Project Description: The project was for the construction of a 72 km four lane, divided, limited 
access expressway from Amagazaki to Ritto, linking the Osaka metropolitan area with that of Kyo-
to in central Japan. The project included the construction of service areas, bus-stops, and in-
ter-changes and also buildings and other permanent facilities for the maintenance and operation 
of this expressway after its completion. It would take four years to complete the project. Its esti-
mated total cost amounted to about $110 million and the WB?s loan would provide about 45? of 
the expenditures incurred since April 1, 1959.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
the WB and Nihon Doro Kodan (Kodan), and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. 
The Loan Agreement provided that Kodan would employ suitable consultants to get advice on de-
sign, location and other related questions on the expressway and on soil problems, construction 
specification and construction procedures. The Guarantee Agreement conformed with to the nor-
mal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and included the provision on the Government?s 
furnishing with funds sufficient for the construction of the project and its maintenance. Also the 
Government was to secure the cooperation of local governments for the construction and mainte-
nance of access roads connecting the expressway with surrounding local communities.
9. Justification: The affected area by the project was one of the most densely populated and heavily 
industrialized areas in Japan. The existing roads were of low standards and congested. The new 
expressway would lead to decrease in travel time and in transport costs, and to a spreading of 
population and industry.
10. Procurement: Foreign contractors with experience in expressway construction were invited to bid 
for certain important section of the expressway. International competitive bidding was therefore 
used for the first time in Japanese highway construction.
Notes:
The project was being discussed within WB in general terms since 1956. A survey team headed by 
Dr. Watkins at a request of the Ministry of Construction studied the whole highway investment pro-
gram and the economic and technical justification of the Nagoya-Kobe toll road in May 1956. Learn-
ing the start of the study, WB sent a list of questions to the survey team in end May 1956, covering all 
points WB would have covered for its own study of a similar subject.25 The WB?s focus on the impor-
tance of the road development in Japan and a project for an expressway between Kobe and Nagoya be-
came sharper than before after WB reviewed the conclusion of the Watkins Report completed in Au-
25 Vide Letter, Russell Dorr to Mr. Michael Sapir, Japanese Highway Survey, May 31, 1956, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway 
Project Folder # 1878752, WB Archives. 
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gust 1956. The Report had great impact on Japanese mind on how far back of the road situation was 
for Japan?s level of economic development. The main conclusion of the Report was that ?The roads of 
Japan are incredibly bad. No other industrial nation has so completely neglected the highway system. 
Neglect of the highway system is imposing a heavy cost burden on the Japanese economy. Expendi-
tures for highway in Japan should be increased to at least yen 180 billion or $500 million per year, ap-
proximately three times the present rate. An expressway from Kobe to Nagoya as part of an expressway 
that will ultimately be built to Tokyo is an essential part of an accelerated highway program. [?] Major 
revision of Japanese transportation policy as a whole will be necessary to assure the quality of trans-
portation necessary for the maximum economic development of Japan [?].?26 On the basis of the re-
view of the above Report, while WB understood the importance of developing a modern road network 
in Japan, WB still had many questions on the proposed expressway project from technical, administra-
tive and economic aspects. To find some answers to the questions and to find ways to make the pro-
posal suitable for WB financing, WB finally sent a mission to Japan in January/February 1958. The 
mission?s report dated April 25, 1958 concluded that an expressway between Kobe and Nagoya ap-
peared economically justified and technically feasible and outlined various measures that the Govern-
ment and Kodan should take for project preparation for WB financing.27 In sending the Report to the 
Government, WB clearly indicated in the letter WB?s support on the proposed project and suggested 
ways to obtain firmer cost estimates of the project. Also suggestion was made to employ foreign con-
sultants to check the design of the expressways with a view to reducing construction cost and to revise 
the scheduling of the construction program to make it in the most economic manner.28 After traffic 
information collected and further studies made by consultants, the Japanese delegation consisting of 
staff of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as well as Construction (MOC) and Kodan visited WB in 
Washington in April 1959 and discussed the whole issues of the Kobe?Nagoya Expressway project. The 
two sides agreed by end April 1959 on: Amagasaki?Ritto section of the Kobe?Nagoya expressway to be 
the proposed project for a possible loan and to be used as a model case for future lending; high esti-
mated cost of the expressway to be reviewed by consultants including the issue of design and construc-
tion methods; need to employ consultants for construction and supervision and training of Japanese 
engineers; the introduction of international bidding on major works; and, the need of coordination 
among Kodan and other Government agencies including local authorities.29 The speed of the prepara-
tion of the project became faster after the general agreement on the project and its appraisal was made 
in October?November 1959. According to the Supervision Report on the project dated June 23, 1963, 
26 Vide E. E. Hagen, F. W. Herring, G. E. McLaughlin, Wilfred Owen, H. M. Sapir and R. J. Watkins, Kobe?Nagoya Expressway 
Survey for the Ministry of Construction, Government of Japan, August 8, 1956, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project 
Folder # 1878752, WB Archives. 
27 Report on the Proposed Expressway in Japan Dated April 25, 1958, Report Number TO-172, the World Bank. 
28 Letter, J. Burke Knapp to Minister of Finance, dated May 21, 1958, and also Letter, I. P. M. Cargill to Mr. Nishihara, dated May 
26, 1958, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project Folder # 1878752, WB Archives.
29 Letter, Martin M. Rosen to His Excellency Mr. Eisaku Sato, Minister of Finance, May 10, 1959, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Ex-
pressway Project Folder # 1878752, WB Archives. 
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the project was completed on or about July 15, 1963. The actual cost of the project amounted to $124 
million was about 13% higher than the original estimate.30
Japanese Government thought that the Kobe-Nagoya Expressway project could be a good chance 
to re-enter into the NY capital market for government bond issue. Initially Blyth and Company was 
approaching the Government and MOF established a Committee to select an Investment Banker for 
Japan, consisting of John D. Rockefeller, III, Tapp of Bank of America, and others. In the end, First 
Boston became the banker for Japan. However, WB thought that the timing of the completion of 
the project preparation, needing a year or so, would not suit the bond issue and that the expressway 
revenue bond, even with government guarantee, would not go far in the capital market. As a result, 
the highway project was eventually to be financed only by WB.31 Please refer to the main section of 
this paper.
The introduction of international bidding was another key issue that WB had to deal with Kodan in 
the course of the project preparation. In accordance with Government procedures for awarding public 
work contracts, Kodan generally invited a few qualified contractors, ordinarily 3 to 5, to tender. The 
lowest bidder was awarded the contract if his price did not exceed the engineers? cost estimates. If no 
acceptable bid was submitted, the original firms and a few additional contractors were invited to re-
bid. There was no legal exclusion of foreign firms, but in practice they were not invited to bid. Further-
more, foreign exchange regulations then made it unattractive for foreign contractors to do business in 
Japan. Japanese contractors were competent but they lacked experience in modern expressway con-
struction, particularly in large-scale earthmoving and asphalt paving works. Only 12 of them, at most, 
would qualify for the larger road construction contracts, ranging form Yen 1 to 2 billion, which Kodan 
intended to award. Only 27 at most would have been qualified to bid on the other works, including 
major structures (bridges, tunnels, etc.). WB considered that foreign contractors with experience in 
expressway construction should be invited to bid for the earthmoving and pavement contracts on the 
same terms as Japanese firms. Their participation in the works was expected to introduce more effi-
cient methods of construction and reduce ultimate construction costs. The Japanese firms were profi-
cient and well equipped for construction large bridges, viaducts and tunnels. There would probably be 
no cost advantage in having foreign firms compete for such works. However, costs might be reduced if 
more Japanese firms than before and foreign contractors were invited to tender for each contract. Final 
agreements with Kodan on bidding were:
(1) Several prequalified foreign contractors will be invited to bid on two major construction contracts 
involving primarily large quantities of earthmoving;
(2) The contractors for these sections will be awarded before those for similar works on other sec-
30 Memorandum, S. C. Hardy, H. Adler and J. Doolan to H.J.van Helden, Japan: Expressway Projects: Back-to-Office Report, 
June 27, 1963 and Letter, H.J.van Helden to Mr. Kentaro Uemura, President of Nihon Doro Kodan, Expressway Projects, July 
11, 1963, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project Folder # 1878758, WB Archives. 
31 Memorandum, Martin M. Rosen to Files, Japan-Relations with Investment Bankers, November 27, 1959, Japan-Amagasaki?
Ritto Expressway Project Folder # 1878752, WB Archives.
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tions of the same nature; and,
(3) A larger number of Japanese contractors than usual will be invited to bid on contracts for major 
structures and other large works.32
Thus international competitive bidding was applied for the first time in Japanese highway construc-
tion. The Government was also willing to authorize foreign contractors who would have obtained con-
struction awards to transfer reasonable sum for profit and overhead, depreciation of equipment and 
foreign personnel.33 Process in which they reached the above conclusions was quite interesting one. 
The need of the introduction of international bidding was discussed in the concrete terms in a meeting 
between WB and a team from Kodan headed by President Kishi in April 1959. Specifically on the April 
20 meeting, WB suggested in order to reduce costs of earth-working the possibility of inviting bids 
from foreign contractors. Kodan agreed that it might lead to efficiency by sharpening up unit costs 
and introducing an element of competition and demonstration. In the end, Kodan was told by WB on 
the principles of the need of international bidding with an exception to international bidding only if it 
could be demonstrated clearly that Japanese contractors were familiar with this type of highway con-
struction and were thoroughly competitive.34 Kodan agreed to invite qualified contractors to submit 
bids for the road construction works, but no foreign bidder submitted its bid.
Third Kawasaki Steel Plate Mill Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$6.0 million relent to Kawasaki Steel (Joint operation with private placement in 
New York through First Boston Corporation of $4 million of 7.5? 10-year non-callable notes. In 
addition, Kawasaki obtained from the Hanover Bank a 5-year loan of $2 million at 6?.)
4. Date of Loan: 12/20/1960
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a plan for the modernization and expansion of Kawa-
saki?s production facilities during the period, May 1959?April 1962, to increase its annual blast 
furnace capacity from 720,000 tons to 1,260,000 tons and its steel ingot capacity from 1.6 million 
tons to 2.3 million tons at plants in Chiba, Fukiai and Nishinomiya. The project included the in-
stallation of a plate mill with an annual capacity of 600,000 tons and all necessary auxiliary facili-
ties. It was to replace facilities having a capacity of 40,000 tons. The entire expansion program 
would cost about US$81 million. The total cost of the new plate mill was estimated at $20.3 mil-
32 Appraisal Report of the Amagasaki?Ritto Expressway Project, Japan, March 7, 1960, the World Bank, pp. 11?12.
33 Vide Side Letter Doro Kodan to WB, Bidding and Contract Award Procedures, March 17, 1960, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Ex-
pressway Project Folder # 1878755, WB Archives. 
34 Vide Memoranda, W. D. S. Fraser to Files, JAPAN-Kobe?Nagoya Highway, April 21?28, 1959, Japan-Amagasaki?Ritto Ex-
pressway Project Folder # 1878753, WB Archives.
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lion. The loan of US$6.0 million would cover about 30? of the total cost. The loan would finance 
all imported equipments, amounting to about US$ 4.2 million and about 9? of the local expendi-
tures on the new plate mill. Procurement would be by international competitive bidding where 
imported equipment was competitive.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB, and a Subsidiary Loan Agree-
ment between JDB and Kawasaki. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement included relending terms, the 
limitation of Kawasaki Steel?s additional indebtedness keeping debt/equity ratio less than 50/50 
(not withstanding these limitations, Kawasaki might borrow from the Daiichi Bank in order to 
maintain its current ratio above 1.5 : 1, and the requirement by Kawasaki to maintain a current ra-
tion of at least 1.5 : 1. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to previous Agreement 
with Japan.
9. Justification: The project was part of a substantial expansion and modernization of the Japanese 
steel industry in order to keep pace with the country?s fast growing demand for steel. The project 
would substitute a modern 4-high plate mill for existing obsolete facilities. This was the third WB 
loan to Kawasaki, the first made in December 1956 for the construction of hot and cold strip mills 
at Chiba plant and the second, in January 1958, for the construction of a blast furnace at Chiba 
plant.
10. Procurement: Imported equipment was to be purchased on a competitive basis. Bids were limited 
to domestic suppliers only where past experiences showed that it was clearly more advantageous 
for the company to purchase the goods in Japan.
Notes:
A study of the market prospects of the Japanese steel industry (Appraisal Report, Kawasaki Steel 
Corporation, December 7, 1960, TO-25a, Annex 3) indicated that the expansion program scheduled 
for completion in 1962 would be justified by the prospective increase in demand. Market prospects for 
Kawasaki?s principal products were generally favorable. Kawasaki?s original idea was to obtain a WB 
loan of $10 million. WB was quite firm in rejecting the request by saying that ?The WB is not going to 
make any loan to steel companies which should look to private market for long-term loans. And if it is 
absolutely necessary for WB to make a loan to introduce a steel company to the private market, such 
loan would only be made as a joint operation, WB matching on a 50 : 50 basis.?35 Indeed Kawasaki 
made real efforts to get into the market,36 but what Kawasaki obtained was a moderate sized loan on 
medium-term basis from a commercial bank. From the point of view of WB, it was not in line with 
35 Vide Memorandum, N. Chakravarti, Japan-Kawasaki Steel Corporation, April 15, 1960, Japan-Kawasaki (3) Project Folder # 
1878772, WB Archives. 
36 Vide Letter, Kosuke Okada, Executive Director, Kawasaki Steel Corporation to Mr. Martin M. Rosen, World Bank, December 
21, 1959 outlining what they have done to get foreign funds. Japan-Kawasaki (3) Project Folder # 1878772, WB Archives. 
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joint market operation with longer-term investment funds. Upon receipt of this comment, Kawasaki 
appointed early 1960 First Boston as their banker for the private placement of their debentures for an 
amount up to US$5 million. They also obtained agreement from the Hanover Bank for a 5-year loan of 
US$2 million to any debentures they would sell. Because of political uncertainties developing then in 
Japan surrounding the ratification of the US?Japan Security Treaty, Kawasaki faced difficulty to obtain 
firm commitment from the investors. In order to encourage the investors to stay in, WB offered US$6 
million loan with the long term funds raised in the market amounting to US$4 million.37 This joint 
operation was the first one of WB operations with private placement without SEC registration.
Two reports on the six Japanese steel companies? projects dated April 6, 1964 and February 10, 1967 
well capture the serious problem of the over-capacity of the steel industry, and each company?s finan-
cial problems that started in 1962. The issues are discussed as the steel sector problems in the main 
text.
The Second Sumitomo Metal Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$7.0 million relent to Sumitomo Metal (Joint operation with private placement 
in New York through Kidder Peabody & Company of US$5.8 million of 7.5? 14-year notes, guar-
anteed by Sumitomo Bank)
4. Date of Loan: 12/20/1960
5. Terms of Loan: 15 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project was part of a plan for the modernization and expansion of Sumi-
tomo?s production facilities during the period, April 1961?March 1963, to increase its annual pro-
ductive capacity for pipes and tubes from 398,600 tons to 518,600 tons and for hoop, strip and 
plate from 216,000 tons to 600,000 tons at plants in Wakayama. The project included the con-
struction of an 80?? semi-continuous combined hot strip and plate mill, a medium size electric re-
sistance welded pipe mill and the expansion of blooming facilities and power, water and transpor-
tation services. The entire expansion program would cost about $128 million. The total cost of the 
WB financed project was estimated at $47.3 million including $ 10 million in foreign exchange for 
imports. The loan of $7.0 million would cover most of imported equipment and about 15? of the 
total cost of the WB financed project.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB, and a Subsidiary Loan Agree-
ment between JDB and Sumitomo. The Subsidiary Loan Agreement included relending terms, the 
37 Vide Memorandum, SLC/O/60-29, Department of Operations Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Kawasaki?s Loan Ap-
plication, July 8, 1960, Japan-Kawasaki (3) Project Folder # 1878772, WB Archives. 
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limitation of Sumitomo?s additional indebtedness keeping debt/equity ratio less than 60/40 before 
March 31, 1963 or 55/45 after thereafter, and the requirement by Sumitomo to maintain a current 
ration of at least 1.5 : 1. The Guarantee Agreement was in the form similar to previous Agreement 
with Japan.
9. Justification: The project was part of a substantial expansion and modernization of the Japanese 
steel industry in order to keep pace with the country?s fast growing demand for steel. The project 
which would modernize and expand Sumitomo?s pipe making facilities was needed to meet the 
increasing demand in such products. The new rolling facilities would furnish the company a sup-
ply of strip and plates used for pipe manufacturing. This was the second WB loan to Sumitomo, 
the first loan of $33 million made in July 1958 for the construction of a blast furnace and a bloom-
ing mill at Wakayama plant.
10. Procurement: Procurement of the imported goods was done by international bidding.
Notes:
Please see the Notes under Kawasaki Steel Project as above. Sumitomo?s case was similar to Kawasaki?s.
Second Kyushu (Shinkokura) Electric Power Project
1. Borrower: Japan Development Bank (JDB)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$12 million relent to Kyushu Power Company (Kyushu)
4. Date of Loan: 03/16/1961
5. Terms of Loan: 20 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project was part of Kyushu?s expansion program estimated to cost about 
US$390 million for the period from April 1960 through March 1965 designed to add 1,007 Mw to 
Kyushu?s then installed generating capacity of 1,958 Mw, with the necessary transmission and dis-
tribution facilities. Of this additional capacity of 636 Mw, or about two-thirds, would be thermal 
and the remainder hydroelectric. The project consisted of the construction of the first stage of 
Shinkokura thermal power plant at Kokura in northern Kyushu, with an installed capacity of 156 
Mw, with a boiler designed to use the low-grade coal available in Kyushu. The project was estimat-
ed to cost about US$27.7 million of which about US$1.6 million being foreign exchange cost. The 
loan would cover about 57? of the total cost incurred after March 1960.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JDB, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. JDB entered into a Subsidi-
ary Loan Agreement with Kyushu corresponding in substance to the terms of the WB?s Loan 
Agreement and the agreements included relending terms, the limitation of Kyushu?s consolidated 
indebtedness not exceeding twice its consolidated capital and surplus. The Guarantee Agreement 
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conforms with to the normal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and it included the provi-
sion that the government covenanted to maintain electricity rates at such level as would allow Ky-
ushu to finance adequate to meet power requirements in its area and to authorize Kyushu to raise 
in Japanese markets such amounts of local currency reasonably require.
9. Justification: The Kyushu?s demand forecasts based on the production estimates of major industri-
al consumers, railroad electrification and other known developments, assumed an annual increase 
of 8? from 1960 to 1965. These forecasts were considered reasonable. The project was designed 
to meet part of demand forecasts.
10. Procurement: Purchases were made on a negotiated basis with Japanese manufacturers and WB 
was satisfied with prices of procured equipment.
Notes:
This loan was one of the worst WB had made to Japan. Probably it was done for political reasons. 
The project history is noteworthy.38 In November 1957, after Black?s visit to Japan when the original 
list of projects were given, three additional projects were presented to the WB, namely, Yawata and Fuji 
steel projects and the Kyushu Power project. When Kyushu tried to get in touch with the appraisal 
team in Japan in December 1957, as the mission was too busy to see Kyushu who wanted to explain 
the project details. Around that time there was the problem of the rate policy. In fact, when the Kansai 
hydroelectric project was made in June 1958, the Government said that it recognized the need for a 
new basis for calculating power rates, that it had appointed a special committee to study the problem 
and that it hoped to take the first step towards increasing the level of revenues of power company with-
in fiscal 1959. This position was confirmed by the government on December 1, 1958 in connection 
with a loan to the Miboro power project. At the annual meeting in October 1958, the Japanese delega-
tion renewed their request for a loan for Kyushu. WB discussed with JDB and Kyushu the ways to pre-
pare a power project in end 1958. Kyushu?s information was received by WB and analyzed by staff of 
Technical Department (TOD) in January 1959 to conclude that the hydroelectric project did not have 
high enough return worthy of WB?s financial support. TOD rejected the hydroelectric project and 
moreover if Kyushu goes ahead with the hydroelectric project, WB should not finance any other proj-
ect, say, even a thermal project if suggested by Khushu. The Department of Operations (Area) dis-
agreed with TOD?s negative stand and the matter went up to a Vice president who took the side with 
the Area. In February 1960, the Government announced the new rate regulations permitting power 
companies to finance their expansion programs on a sounder basis. In March 1960, Kyushu proposed 
WB with another thermal project, Shinkokura (156,250 Kw), which was already under construction 
(40? complete). The Kyushu and WB teams argued cost of electricity and cost estimates of the proj-
ect. After finding acceptable cost of electricity and project cost, an appraisal mission was finally sent to 
38 Vide Memorandum, N. K. Chakaravarti to Mr. Martin M. Rosen, Japan-Kyushu Power Project II, June 9, 1960, Japan-Kyushu 
Power Project (02) Folder # 1878813, WB Archives.
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Kyushu in July/August 1960. The mission reported the project acceptable for a WB loan. The only 
problem concerned non-competitive procurement by Kyushu but this issue was waived by WB for ex-
ceptional case and thus the real remaining problem was financial as Kyushu?s financial position was 
worst among four other power companies financed by WB because of the power rate system affecting 
negatively against debt/equity ratio and revaluation reserve to share capital. In January 1961, the Gov-
ernment finally sent a message to WB that Kyushu rates were allowed to increase 10.8? early February 
and the Government and Kyushu were invited for negotiations. After the receipt of telex from MOF on 
an actual rate increase by 10.5?, instead of 10.8?, on March 7, 1961, the project was sent to the Board 
in March 1961.
The Japanese National Railways New Tokaido Line Project
1. Borrower: Japanese National Railways (JNR)
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$80 million (concurrent with an issue of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Pub-
lic Corporation, 15-year bonds amounting to $15 million and 3-, 4- and 5-year bonds amounting 
to $5 million, guaranteed by Government of Japan, in the NY market)
4. Date of Loan: 05/02/1961
5. Terms of Loan: 20 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project included the construction and equipping of a new double track, 
standard gauge, electric railway line, called the New Tokaido Line (Shinkansen), which would tra-
verse the industrial heart of Japan and would connect five of the six largest cities, Tokyo, Yokoha-
ma, Nagoya, Kyoto and Osaka. It would supplement the existing narrow gauge railway line serving 
the area. Construction work started in fiscal 1959/60 to become operational in mid-1964 at an es-
timated cost of US$548 million. The loan would cover about 15? of the total cost of the project.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and JNR, and the Guarantee Agreement between Japan and WB. The Loan Agreement pro-
vided that JNR would give priority to the project in its construction program. The Guarantee 
Agreement conformed with to the normal pattern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and includ-
ed an undertaking by the Government to make arrangements for funds sufficient for the comple-
tion of the project.
9. Justification: The affected area by the project was one of the most densely populated and heavily 
industrialized areas in Japan. The existing narrow gauge line, connecting all large cities in Japan 
was utilized to its full capacity and the project would relieve the existing line from long distance 
passenger traffic and therefore improve its freight-carrying capacity. The competitive position of 
the railway for passenger traffic would be improved by the project.
10. Procurement: International competitive bidding was used for major contracts for the first time by 
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JNR. Major contracts were defined as ones for the construction of steel bridges amounting to 
?200 million, for other construction works amounting to ?500 million and for rolling stock in-
cluding motive power amounting to ?400 million.
Notes:
WB?s initial impression of a New Tokaido Line (Shinkansen) project was lukewarm. From early 
1959, JNR tried to convince WB that the Shinkansen project was a project worthy of WB?s support and 
a couple of times JNR dispatched its senior staff to WB to explain the concept of the project. Accord-
ing to the memorandum of WB, JNR mission was in Washington to present some facts and figures of 
JNR and to have an informal discussion with WB staff with a view to discussing the suitability of the 
project for a future loan. WB was quite clear in saying to JNR that the project was not in the lending 
program requested by the government for 1957?60 and that the question of additional lending for Ja-
pan would be a subject for discussion between WB and the Japanese delegation during the annual 
meeting in September 1959.39 Informal discussions continued and led to the understanding of poten-
tial problems if the project were to be supported by a WB loan. They were essentially poor financial 
position of JNR in the form of operating losses for the years 1960?63, a low rate of return to total assets 
of 1? and a negative interest coverage. As for the proposed Shinkansen, its financial forecasts indicat-
ed very satisfactory results. On technical and operational problems, major questions were on the ex-
tent of the utilization of the existing line, the feasibility of proposed 250 km/hour for passenger trains 
and the connectivity between the application of a new gauge, standard, and the existing narrow gauge 
system of the whole remaining railway system. After the annual meeting in September 1959, internal 
discussions on the lending program and particularly discussions WB had with a visiting JNR team in 
January 1960, WB position on the project became more positive than before.40 According to the mem-
orandum dated January 15, 1960 summarizing the discussion between WB and JNR, its conclusions 
were: (1) The technical experts of JNR are highly qualified; (2) JNR plans to proceed with caution and 
will carry out extensive trial runs before deciding on maximum speed of trains, 250 km/hour; (3) Con-
struction of the permanent way will be in accordance with conventional practice; (4) Additional cost 
resulting from the planned high speed will be very limited; (5) the rolling stock for passengers will be 
to a large extent along conventional lines and waste of investment would be minimized in case trials 
would prove that the planned maximum speed of 200 km/hour could not be achieved in the near fu-
ture; (6) The initial investment for rolling stock for freight transport will be very limited and amount 
to only 5? of the total investment; and, (7) The new Tokaido Line project would to a certain extent be 
39 Memorandum, N. K. Charkravarti to Files, Japan-Railway Project, July 14, 1959, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project Folder # 
1878831, WB Archives.
40 In the letter to the Minister of Finance, WB indicated that technical staff of WB learned a lot from JNR mission?s presentation 
of operational and developmental problems of JNR and the thorough documentation of Shinkansen project. Letter, Martin M. 
Rosen, Director, Department of Operations-Far East to His Excellency, Mr. Eisaku Sato, the Minister of Finance, January 14, 
1960 and Memorandum, H. J. van Helden to Mr. S. Aldewereld, Discussions with Representatives of Japanese Railways, Janu-
ary 15, 1960, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project Folder # 1878831, WB Archives. 
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of an experimental nature, although this has been reduced considerably because of the reduction of the 
maximum speed from the initially planned 250 km/hour to the 200 km/hour. The project was finally 
appraised in May/June 1960 and its appraisal report was completed in January 1961.
Concerning the issues on the need of the Government to try the private capital market and weak fi-
nancial outlook of the whole JNR, WB was firm on the first and flexible on the second. On the first, 
WB did offer a joint operation with a loan for the Shinkansen project, the government did not go for 
the private market in the form of a joint operation. Japan wished to obtain a $100 million from WB for 
the Shinkansen project and at the same time, the Government wanted to sell $15?20 million bonds for 
the Nippon Telephone & Telegram Public Corporation, a government corporation through Dillon, 
Read & Co., Inc., First Boston and Smith, Burney & Co. with the guarantee of the Government. How-
ever because of political disturbance in Japan, WB was doubtful if the bonds selling would be success-
ful at yields acceptable to Japan even with the assistance of a simultaneous WB lending. WB was there-
fore prepared to go head with the processing of the proposed loan amounting to $80 million if the $20 
million issue would be successful and the amount of the loan would be determined if the issue, unsuc-
cessful. On the second, WB?s management supported the proposed loan because of the high produc-
tivity of the project itself (Shinkansen), the efficient technical and financial management of JNR, and 
the very conservative presentation of financial presentations. This implied that WB was not planning 
to have financial covenant attached to the loan in order to improve the financial position of JNR.41
This loan was eventually made concurrently with an issue of bonds in New York by Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone. After giving preliminary approval to the WB?s loan, the underwriters filed a reg-
istration statement on April 10, 1961, with the Security and Exchange Commission for a public issue of 
US$15 million, consisting of three, four and five year bonds amounting to US$5 million and 15-year 
bonds amounting to US$10 million. The public offering was made on May 2, 1961. Although WB?s 
President Report mentions the amount of bonds being $15 million consisting of, three, four, five-year 
bonds amounting in total to $5 million and fifteen-year bonds amounting to $10 million, the letter 
from Dillon, Read & Co., Inc. dated May 2, 1961 indicated the same for five-year bonds amounting to 
$5 million, but for fifteen-year bonds amount as $15 million instead of President Report?s $10 million.
The project completed on time with high quality works from all aspects of the project and the new 
rail service between Tokyo and Osaka started on October 1, 1964. According to the various supervi-
sion mission reports,42 during execution of the project, there were three sets of problems. One con-
cerned railway construction including cost increase and technical operational details of the new line. 
41 Memorandum, SLC/O/61-2, Department of Operations Far East to Staff Loan Committee, Japan-Loan Application for New 
Tokaido Line Railway Project, January 3, 1961 and Memorandum, SLC/M/61-1, Staff Loan Committee, Minutes of Staff Loan 
Committee held on Thursday, January 5, 1961, January 12, 1961, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project Folder # 1878831, WB Ar-
chives. 
42 End-Use Report, G. Lubbeke, Japan-Japanese National Railways, the New Tokaido Line Project, April 7, 1964, Japan-New 
Tokaido Line Project Folder # 1878833; Supervision Full Report, G. Lubbeke and Frank Chapman, Japan-Japanese National 
railways, the New Tokaido Line Project, April 1, 1966; and, Supervision Full Report, G. Lubbeke, Japan-Japanese National 
Railways, the New Tokaido Line Project, July 7, 1967, Japan-New Tokaido Line Project Folder # 1878834. 
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According to the last supervision Mission?s report dated July 7, 1967, the original cost estimate for the 
New Tokaido Line project in 1960 amounted to $548 million and the actual cost as at October 1, 1964, 
when the train operations began, $1,055 million, an increase of about 93?. The extent of cost increas-
es looked unusually high. The increases were due mainly to cost of right of way, the changes in align-
ment on request of local governments, additional works including elevated tracks and over as well as 
underpasses and widening of tunnels and bridges and increased labor cost. On train operations, initial 
travelling time between Tokyo and Osaka was 4 hours; from November 1965, travelling time superex-
press trains became 3 hours 10 minutes. During the first full year of operations, the traffic in 1965/66 
was 10.7 billion passenger-km and same in 1966/67, 14.5 billion passenger-km, 6? less than the fore-
cast made in 1960. On freight operations, JNR was not going to offer freight service, as it was more 
economic to handle containerized freight at high speed on the old line utilizing train paths made avail-
able by the shift of passenger traffic to the new line. The second concerns international bidding on 
procurement and JNR experiences were detailed in the main text. The third concerned the financial 
problems of JNR as a whole. While Shinkansen was expected to be highly profitable, JNR?s total finan-
cial position was deteriorating since 1964/65: operating ratio after depreciation but before interest was 
109 in 1965/67 (Actual), 98 in 1966/67 (Preliminary) with some passenger fare increase in 1966, 103 in 
1967/68, 110 in 1968/69, and 124 in 1969/70 (all forecasted). The report stated clearly that the situa-
tion was very unsatisfactory and that the government decision was necessary to improve the situation.
Nihon Road Kodan Kobe-Nagoya Expressway Second Project
1. Borrower: Nihon Doro Kodan (Japan Highway Public Corporation (Kodan))
2. Guarantor: Government of Japan
3. Loan Amount: US$40 million
4. Date of Loan: 11/29/1961
5. Terms of Loan: 23 years
6. Interest Rate: 5?3/4?
7. Project Description: The project was for the expressway construction of 111 km four lane, divid-
ed, limited access expressway from Ichinomiya?Ritto (104 km) & Amagasaki?Nishinomiya 
(7 km). It followed the first expressway project to complete the connection between Kobe and Na-
goya. The project included the construction of service areas, bus-stops, and inter-changes and also 
buildings and other permanent facilities for the maintenance and operation of this expressway af-
ter its completion. It would take four years to complete the project. Its total cost was estimated at 
about US$212 million and the WB?s loan would provide about 19? of the expenditures incurred 
since April 1, 1960.
8. Legal Instruments and Legal Authority: The legal instruments were the Loan Agreement between 
WB and Nihon Doro Kodan (Kodan), and the Guarantee Agreement between WB and Japan. The 
Loan Agreement provided that Kodan would employ suitable consultants to get advice on design, 
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location and other related questions on the expressway and on soil problems, construction specifi-
cation and construction procedures. The Guarantee Agreement conformed with the normal pat-
tern of the WB?s guarantee agreements, and included the provision on the Government?s furnish-
ing with funds sufficient for the construction of the project and its maintenance. Also the 
Government was to secure the cooperation of local governments for the construction and mainte-
nance of access roads connecting the expressway with surrounding local communities.
9. Justification: The affected area by the project was one of the most densely populated and heavily 
industrialized areas in Japan. The existing roads were of low standards and congested. The new 
expressway would lead to decrease in travel time and in transport costs, and to a spreading of 
population and industry. The road user savings alone would represent an economic return of 
some 10?15? annually from the start of operation.
10. Procurement: International competitive bidding was used following the first expressway project. 
Foreign contractors with experience in expressway construction were invited to bid for all major 
works of the project.
Notes:
The first expressway project of which a loan of $40 million was approved in March 1960 was linking 
Kobe?Osaka with Kyoto. Its work was proceeding as originally planned. The Government requested 
WB to make a second loan of $40 million to Kodan to complete the Kobe?Nagoya expressway. Because 
of the experiences of WB and Kodan having prepared the first expressway project, the process of the 
preparation of the second went smoothly. According to the last supervision report on the project dated 
March 19, 1965,43 the expressway sections were opened to traffic some six months later than anticipat-
ed, the last section in September 1964. Traffic volumes and toll revenues were slightly lower than the 
forecast because more passenger cars diverted to expressway than forecast, and the resulting decreased 
congestion on existing roads encouraged truckers to remain on the old roads. Apparently, the long dis-
tance truckers had not yet adjusted to the new mode of transport, expressways with tolls.
This loan became the last loan to Japan except a small scale lending for joint operations which 
would make possible private companies? access to the market. On international bidding of construc-
tion works financed by the loan, please see the relevant section in the main text.
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